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This dissertation w?,s !.Ir.dertaken to examine and review the theoretica1 issues concerning decision-making. From this analysis, a new
and innovative technique for problem-solving was developed, entitled
Integrated Management Decision-making. The underlying theoretical
framework of this model involved the integration of the organizat"ion
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and the environment.

Political, economic, social, cultural, and other

community factors were discussed as major influences in the decisionmaking process.

Integrated Management Decision-Making was derived

from the combination of four existing theoretical perspectives:

(1)

decision-making is a process; (2) decision-making involves the ability
to make rational choices; (3) decision-making assumes a systematic
methodology; and (4) decision-making is conducted by human beings
attempting to achieve a desired consequence or result.
Further, this study addressed the application of this new model
to the task of police patrol deployment in small urban centers. The
City of Jonesboro, Arkansas was used as a test case for the demonstration of this process.
After examining over 8,300 radio-dispatched calls for service in
1980, a method for deployment was proposed utilizing Integrated
Management Decision-Making.
The

statistic~l

techniques of Multiple Response Analysis and

Kruska1-Wa11is Analysis of Variance by Ranks were utilized to explore
the relationship between existing patrol procedures and proposed
deployment design based on specific allocation variables designated by
the police manager.

The objective of the new deployment plan was to

achieve an optimum patrol scheme with equalized workload between
districts. This involved the determination of several decisionproducts:

(1) the calculation of an assignment-availability factor;

(2) the design of sector boundaries; (3) the calculation of shift
requirements; and (4) the assessment of patrol strategies and
techniques.

This goal was achieved and recommendations for the

Jonesboro Police Department were developed.
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Finally, Integrated Management Decision-Making was discussed as a
catalyst for change in current police management thinking.

Futuristic

concepts of organization-environmental lGarning, long-range planning,
and strategic modeling were suggested as necessary improvements in
police decison-making.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The efficient and effective use of police manpower has always
been a problem, however, it has become increasingly serious in the
last few years. That part of serious crime (reported to the police)
in the United States has nearly doubled in the last decade, both
totally and categorically, and the demand for police services has kept
pace with this increase. 1 Clearly, this phenomenal increase in
criminal activity has produced major and, in some areas, critical
demands on the resources of municipal police agencies, i.e., personnel, facility, equipment, etc. 2 Unlike the 1960's and early 1970's,
law enforcement agencies were unable to expand their level of service
delivery because of a reluctance on the part of the local officials to
continually increase the police budget. This reluctance can be attributed to several factors.

For example, much of law enforcement's

expansion during the last 15 years can be traced to the creation of
the Federal Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, which provided
substantial financial resources allegedly to improve police operations. Recently, a dramatic revision in the agency's guidelines and
goals has severely cut what was once a relatively large fund for local
police service improvement. 3
To make financial matters even worse, an inflationary economy has
produced further constraints and burdens on urban police budgets.
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Major increases in gasoline prices and labor/personnel costs have
forced many local governments to consider themselves in a state of
crisis. 4 Faced with rising crime and increased calls for service, a
growing city would have traditionally sought to add more sworn police
personnel. However', the inflationary cost to initially hire, train,
and equip one patrol officer now ranges from $10,000 to $35,000 as
compared to $5,000 to $12,000 just ten years ago. Such personnel
costs account for 91 to 97 percent of the average department's total
budget. 5 Adding manpower may no longer be economically feasible; in
fact, that option may not even be available to law enforcement
managers in the current economic environment. With these dilemmas, it
is understandable why city administrators are reluctant to increase
police budgets.
To exacerbate this fiscal crisis, there is a current social and
political movement that scrutinizes and questions government spending. Based in part on the public's cry for the efficient use of tax
revenues, the movement centers around political, awareness and an
underlying tax revolt. 6 The impending result is an increase of
political pressure on city governments to justify expenditures.
Complicating this matter is a set of conflicting evidence about
the effect of the police on crime. For the last 15 years, the common
assumption that an increase in law enforcement patrol capability will
result in a corresponding decrease in crime has been strongly challenged. 7 Specifically, the well known Kansas City Preventative
Patrol Experiment produced a plethora of controversy about the
validity of this assumption. 8 The study attempted to determine the
effect routine patrol had on a number of different crime-related
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measures. Different patrol techniques were used in three beats of the
city. The "reactive" beat totally eliminated patrol activity, and
only responded to calls for service. The "control" beat used routine
patrol manpower with no change in personnel level. The "proactive"
beat doubled or tripled patrol activity through an increase in manpower. The results of this study showed that none of the three levels
of patrol manpower differed significantly in their effect on the level
of crime as increased by victimization surveys and reported crime. 9
Although there have been a number of criticisms aimed at the
validity of the Kansas City study, the results have forced a
re-examination of the traditional use of more funds and more manpower
to combat the ever-increasing occurrences of crime.

Indeed, James Q.

Wilson has recently proposed that it may not be the number of police
on patrol which produce lower crime rates, but the patrol behavior,
style, or strategy which is employed by individual officers. 10
These predicaments have been particularly troublesome for small
urban centers, many of which are almost totally dependent on one
primary economic base, i.e. farming, construction, mining, etc.
Further, small cities are often characterized by strong political
bodies which polarize the community into two separate groups. One is
composed of those who support law enforcement and are usually associated with local business firms, fraternal orders, and small government bodies which form a distinct and visible power structure; while
the other is made up of those who oppose law enforcement, and are frequently viewed as the target of police activities and usually represents those people who are "watched.~ll This second group is
usually a segregated minority or a non-conventional public.

In other
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words, small cities exhibit a unique political and economic environment which is more acutely affected by rising crime rates and
increased calls for service without corresponding increases in
resources. 12
Faced with denied requests for additional manpower, it is evident
that the only realistic course of action left to deal with increasing
crime and economic problems is to more effectively use the personnel
and resources currently available within a given police department.
This means that city managers must increase police productivity by
improving current police practices to the best level known, that is,
to get better performance without a proportionate increase in
cost.1 3 One of the best methods to increase police productivity is
to develop an allocation design which yields the most effective and
efficient use of existing police resources.
The clearest example of increasing productivity is having personnel assigned when and where crime is highest or calls for service are
heaviest. 14 This is the primary goal in allocation design.
Police Patrol Allocation: An Historical Overview
Early Developments. The analysis of police patrol allocation in
the United States began with the work of August Vollmer in Berkeley,
California, during the early 1900's. Vollmer established a list of
"police functions" which still appears in all standard manuals on
municipal po1icing. 15 With little variation, the list of police
functions consists of the following items: crime prevention, crime
repression, apprehension, criminal investigation, public service,
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maintenance of peace and security, regulation of non-criminal
activities, traffic control, and provision of emergency services.
According to Vollmer, these functions described the police mission.
He was the first to associate these functions with a territorial unit
of work or the "beat." Vollmer's contribution to patrol allocation
can be viewed twofold.

First, he placed a priority emphasis on the

study of the principles and methods of beat construction by formulating a criteria of allocation; patrolman should be distributed by areas
in proportion to the amount of work to be done. 16 And secondly,
Vollmer initiated the concept of police work as a profession, rooted
in the freedom of the police from political interference and the
advancement of technological innovations in patrol assignments.
Even though Vollmer contributed much to the establishment of
police professionalism and patrol strategy, there is a profound contradiction in American policing which he failed to address.

It is

futile to assert that the police can be or should be impartial in the
face of political conflict between urban and rural,

s~ate

and city, or

religious and ethnic interest groups.17 This contradiction cannot
be resolved by blaming undesirable police actions upon illigitimate
political interference. Contrary to this thought, the police must
consider, and act within, the political body of the community. This
\

is particularly true in the decision-making process for manpower
deployment.

Political biases and structures must be considered as an

important form of input for patrol allocation.
Recognizing this concept as early as 1920, Raymond Fosdick
expanded on Vollmer's earlier throughts.

Noting that patrol deploy-

ment must change and alter with new political, economic, employment,
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residential, and crime-occurring conditions, Fosdick proposed that the
type and mode of patrol must adapt to new situations. 18 He was the
first to recognize the relationship between a changing community
environment and a patrol strategy or aiiocation design that evolved
with this situation.
In 1929, Bruce Smith in his book, Police Systems in the United
States, recognized still another important aspect in patrol deployment.

Indicating that patrol had been traditionally "distributed on

an equal, or nearly equal, basis throughout the twenty-four hours of
the day," despite marked increases in workload and crime occurrences,
Smith advanced the use of crime analysis in allocation design. 19
For the first time, patrol distribution was related to activity and
crime documentation by police records. This was an important step for
allocation design, as managers recognized the need to deploy personnel
in an effort to maximize patrol activity during those times of highest
crime and workload occurrence.
The Hazard Model.

It was not until 1941, that the concept of

effective distribution through maximum protection was fully realized.
O. W. Wilson, then Chief

o~

Police at Wichita, Kansas, established the

"relative need" approach to police deployment. Emphasizing the
redistribution of patrol forces based on a set of "proportionate need
factors," Wilson utilized the application of law enforcement to the
locations, during the times and toward the particular criminal violations which represented the highest police demands. 20
Elaborating on his original work, Wilson formulated a deployment
scheme based on allocation by hazard. 21 The formula was first
initiated in the Los Angeles Police Department in 1953 and with
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relatively minor changes, is still in use today.

Each type of crime

is given a weighted hazard score and, by prioritizing the incidence of
crime, a total weighted sum for each region is calculated. The patrol
personnel are allocated accordingly.
In a more recent statement concerning allocations by hazard,
Roy C. McLaren re-emphasizes that "patrolmen should be distributed in
proportion to the need for police service ••• the essence of the
distribution problem lies in measuring the proportionate need. 22
For McLaren and Wilson this problem is remedied by the extensive
use of a weighted scale in analyzing past historical data. Calls for
service are examined in relation to a specific geographical area to
form a criterion ratio. The Los Angeles Police Department exemplifies
this deployment scheme by using the following ten weighted factors to
calculate manpower a110cation: 23
1. Percentage of FBI Index Crime per division (murder, armed
robbery, forcible rape, aggravated assault, burglary, theft
over $200.00, and motor vehicle theft).
2.

Percentage of radio calls

3. Percentage of adult and juvenile felony arrests
4.

Percentage of adult and juvenile misdemeanor arrests

5. Percentage of property loss
6.

Percentage of fatal and injury traffic accidents

7. Percentage of vehicles recovered
8.

Percentage of Los Angeles City Population

9. Percentage of street miles, and
10. Percentage of population density
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Unfortunately, such weight factors are largely subjective by
nature and subject to criticism, a problem for which there appears to
be no guidelines or formulating principles. 24 Further, the hazard
formula is greatly affected by officer-initiated activity. The number
of arrests made or crimes detected by officers may be a direct result
of the number of officers in a particular region, thereby generating a
spurious "need" for more manpower. On the other hand, the hazard
formula cannot be dismissed as an erroneous venture in patrol planning.

Established as one of the first analytical methods for deploy-

ment, the hazard formula utilizes a police data base in an attempt to
equalize workload.

It historically marks the first method of deploy-

ment which combined quantitative procedures and intuitive judgment.
The hazard formula model still remains as one of the most widely
utilized and accepted methods for municipal police allocation. As
Donald Shanahan points out:

"These weightings are not perfect, but

until an improved system is developed, the assignment of weights
according to classes of events is the best available."25
The Phoenix Model.

Employing the hazard formula concept with a

predictive computer model has been one of the newer innovations for
manpower deployment based on a proportionate need ratio.
1960's, Phoenix, Arizona adopted such a system.

In the early

It can be viewed as a

sophisticated and natural evolvement from the hazard formula model.
In the Phoenix method, the basic hazard is defined as the delay
plus travel plus service times for all calls during a given time
period in a given place. 26 Cars are deployed by district, shift,
and day of week in proportion to the fraction of the total citywide
hazard predicted (by computer adaptation) to occur in that specific
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time period and geographic region. The computer is used to extrapolate data from the previous tel, weeks on the number of incidents and
elapsed time (defined as delay time plus travel and service time) for
each shift, day of week, and one-fourth-square-mile geographic
area. 27
The Phoenix model proposes two constructive innovations to the
hazard formula concept. They are (1) the use of predicted calls in
the method rather than just calls actually experienced in the part and
(2) the use of elapsed time rather than just volume of calls.
Unfortunately, the formula still involves the subjective weighting of
incidents; and in this case, the limitation is even more serious as
all calls receive the same weighting. Thus, a cold burglary or barking dog call receives an equal weight with a robbery or crime in progress. Another inherent weakness in the method is the failure to
address the preventive and deterrent aspects of patrol. Kakalik and
Wildhorn note this problem in their work entitled Aids to DecisionMaking in Police Patrol. After administering an exhaustive survey to
the Phoenix Department, they observe that while approximately 20-25
percent of a patrolman's time is allocated to preventive patrol, there
still remains no direct value which can act as a weight or input for
the computer application in the hazard formula prediction. 28
Further, as actual time spent on servicing an incident is computed by
elapsed time factors, a theoretical argument can be raised. Since all
calls receive the same weight and, the major use of the computer is in
calculating "elapsed time," then the method does not distribute
personnel by proportionate workload need but rather by proportionate
time need. The criticism raised is that such an allocation

pla~

must
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involve a very refined collection system. One which has a much
broader base of data (than ten weeks) to account for changes in the
community envir"onment and police policy procedure.

If the goal is to

orovide a capability to plan based on prediction, a much more refined
~nd

comprehensive workload analysis must be undertaken.
The St. Louis Model.

In 1964, Richard F. Crowther proposed a

series of computer programs for the allocation of police personnel in
St. Louis, Missouri. 29 These programs were subsequently refined and
adapted to the St. Louis Police Department by Thomas McEwan. 30 The
resource allocation project advanced the deployment process by incorporating two intricate and innovative techniques:

prediction by

exponential smoothing and assignment of response cars by queuing.
The St. Louis method is based on a demand for police services
predicted by hour and geographic area, using projections based on past
demand data with modifications for weekly and seasonal variations.
The prediction method employs a statistical technique called
"exponential smoothing" that takes into account variations in the call
rate by time of day, day of week, week of year, and also adjusts for
overall trends in the call rate (general increase or decrease compared
to previous year).

In effect, the exponential smoothing technique

estimates future calls by "averaging" the volumes of calls experienced
in past weeks, with the more recent weeks' data being given the most
weight. 31 The reslJ.1t is a predicted estimate of the number of calls
to occur in any given area in each hour of the week. The service
times of incidents are also smoothed in similar manner.
By making certain technical assumptions, the prediction model
asserts that manpower can be distributed on the basis of urgent calls
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having to wait in delay for a specific length of time before being
serviced. 32 This is described as a queuing delay. St. Louis allocates personnel based on the probability that, at most, 15 percent of
each district's calls will be delayed in queue. This predictive function has produced a unique effect on conventional policing in
St. Louis. Since the number of response cars is set so that less than
15 percent of all calls will incur a delay, it is necessary to split
the patrol division into two entirely distinct functions--one to be
concerned with answering calls for service (which comprises the
majority of the patrol force), the second to perform crime prevention
duties.
The St. Louis experience was the first major attempt to apply
mathematical and probability modeling to the task of police manpower
allocation. Although the exponential smoothing technique has been
found to be adequately accurate, there are still several weaknesses
that limit the overall procedure. 33
First, there appears to be no attempt to take into account "free"
or "patrol" time of officers on duty. That time which couid not be
accounted for in elapsed time was "averaged" into the weekly estimate
of demand. For this reason, it can be assumed that actual delays were
much higher than those predicted by the computer programs. However,
in the St. Louis experience, there was a noted excess of resources to
keep the actual number of calls encountering a queue well under ten
percent. 34 If such resources had not been available, then the total
number of response cars would have necessarily been less, resulting in
a higher percentage of calls incurring a queuing delay.
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Second, the above situation highlights yet another problem. The
St. Louis deployment method utilizes only

~

criterion within the

mathematical technique to determine the required number of response
cars; that being the fraction of calls that cannot be answered
immediately by a police unit. The necessary assumption is that the
estimated weekly demand follows a typical pattern over the hours of
the week. This assumption can be challenged by modern crime specific
analysis proponents. 35 Further, in order for predictions of
criminal behavior to be effective in deployment, the predictions must
be very delineated as to time and location. Techniques which are
average or estimate general predictions about police workload and the
total number of calls for service in a city are simply "not very helpful in the day-to-day deployment of police officers." 36
Third, the performance measure (or criterion) of percentage of
calls delayed does not distinguish priority. All calls have the same
chance of experiencing a queue. Such a design may well reduce the
average response time to all calls but may indeed complicate the
importance of a fast response to a specific call. The question
arises, "Shou1d a traffic hazard or barking dog call carry the same
weight as a quick response to an armed robbery in progress?"

In the

St. Louis model, there is no way to distinguish among calls; a
definite drawback to formulating dispatch policy.
Finally, and most important, the St. Louis technique (specifically exponential smoothing) necessitates the user to select one or
more parameters that distinguish weight between old and new data.

If

patterns in the community and in the workload change rapidly, then an
increase or decrease in police resources must also accompany the
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change. The problem lies in continually monitoring and updating the
computer program with respect to crime trends, community patterns,
environmental factors, and police department policies and strategies.
This can be extremely expensive and time consuming. Then too, the
issue of old versus new data take on another aspect. What parameters
will be used to account for these extraneous variables in the updating
stage? Recognizing this fault, police administrators would be subject
to constant political pressure as to the establishing of update
criteria. By this time, the allocation plan would be so complex and
so refined as to detract from its original purpose. Few departments
would be able to justify the cost in terms of gathering, analyzing,
and implementing such a deployment plan.
The LEMRAS Model. LEMRAS is an acronym for Law Enforcement Manpower Resource Allocation System.

It was developed by the IBM

Corporation and based on the St. l.ouis System. The program is available for lease to police departments, and several large cities,
including Philadelphia and Los Angeles have implemented the system.
The LEMRAS method and the St. Louis model are the same except
that the LEMRAS program establishes a manner in which calls are
serviced by priority •. Call$ for sen'ices are divided in a large

number of event codes. These codes are then assigned into one of
three priority levels which designate the length of time the call will
be held in queue. For example, a "cold" burglary may be placed in
priority three while a robbery in progress is assigned a priority
one.

Calls are then dispatched in order of decreasing priority.

Thus, all priority one and two calls would be dispatched before any
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priority three call; thereby decreasing the delay time for any high
priority incident.
Being so closely related to the St. Louis model, the LEMRAS program offers essentially the same benefits and suffers from the same
limitations. 37
Simulation and Travel-Time Models.

In 1967, the work of the

Science and Technology Task Force of the President's Commission on Law
Enforcement and Administration of Justice marked a major advancement
in the application of technology and operations research to problems
of criminal justice. 38 Recommending that operational problems for
police agencies (such as efficient police patrol allocation) be
anaiyzed from a quantitative point of view, the Task Force called for
the use of sophisticated computer techniques, analytic probability
models, and intricate engineering methods.
As a result, Richard Larson, from the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology focused on the quantitative prospects of analyzing urban
police patrol.

In 1969, he designed a program similar to LEMRAS, how-

ever, much more sophisticated and refined.
The simulation model is based on an allocation of manpower by
travel time. Larson prioritizes the expected time of travel to a
crime based on the relationship of geographical characteristics,
number of patrol units, and the demand and service rates of
calls. 39 By using heuristic programming algorithms, a very sophisticated model is produced to search for optimal response times and
areas.

A simulation model is then employed to investigate the impli-

cations of complicated allocation and deployment tactics. The simulation model works in the following way:
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Incidents are generated throughout the city, randomly in time and
space. Each incident has an associated priority number, the lowest
numbers designating the more important incidents. As each incident
becomes known, an attempt is made to assign (dispatch) a patrol unit
to the scene of the incident. In certain cases this assignment cannot be performed because the congestion level of the force 1S too
high; then, the incident report joins a queue of waiting reports.
The queue is depleted as patrol units become avai1ab1e. 40
Larson's use of random patrol positioning is based on the assumption that random crime occurrences are evenly distributed over a given
rectangular sector, and that the position of the patrol unit and incident of the call are independent.
the call is:
E(Tr)
where:

= 1/3

His expected travel time E(Tr) to

r~ + rn]

Lvx

E (Tr)
Xo
Yo
Vx
Vy

vy

= travel time

= width of sector
= length of sector
= effective travel

speed to the east-west direction

= effective travel speed to the north-south direction 41

Thus, Larson's program is similar to LEMRAS, except that more than
three priority levels are permitted and an average length of time a call in
each priority level will wait in queue is calculated.
, There are two major advances over LEMRAS that Larson's model pproposes.

First, the program is very flexible to accommodate almost any set

of priorities and/or dispatching policies. Second, the simulation model is
based on an algorithm which considers a number of performance measures
other than just queuing delays. Larson discussed a variety of performance
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measures that could be considered, but the actual ones included in his program were:
• Average travel time to incident
• Average patrol frequency (how often a car passes a random point
in the precinct while on preventative patrol)
• Patrol hours outside of elapsed time or "preventive" patrol time 42
At first glance, Larson's model can be viewed as a major step in allocation design. Since the simulation technique is extremely flexible, outputs on a variety of interests may be obtained, including policy and management issues. However, in exploring the program in closer detail,
several fundamental weaknesses are observed.
Larson bases his simulation and travel time models on the assumptions
that (a) crime occurs randomly, (b) the probability of space-time coincidence of crime and patrol is a quantifiable and influencing value, and (c)
crime occurrence and patrol are independent. Unfortunately, these assumptions are rarely met.

Proponents of crime specific analytic techniques

argue convincingly that crime does not occur randomly.43 Additionally,
it has been shown by directed patrol techniques that the position of a
patrol unit and incident of a call are not independent. 44 Consider the
recent initiatives of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administratlon regarding patrol research. These studies, to include the Patrol Emphasis Program
(PEP), the Integrated Criminal Apprephension Program (ICAP), and Managing
Patrol Operations (MPO), support the theoretical argument that crime does
not occur randomly; that it follows specific patterns and trends which can
be plotted. 45 Hence, the crime analysis techniques for directed patrol,
saturation patrol, task forces,
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etc. Capturing the essence of crime analysis and the fundamental argument
that crime does not occur randomly, William G. Gay writes:
Crime analysis is the process of systematically examining recent
crime incidents and criminal behavior in an effort to identify
crime patterns and characteristics so as to permit the effective
deployment of personnel and resources and the adoption of appropriate strategies and tactics. 46
Another distressing point in Larson's model is his emphasis on
gaming theory.

Being one of the first mathematical models to propose

the prevention of crime through uniform patrol, he equates the
probability of detering or intercepting a crime in progress to the
probability of a crime occurring. This concept necessarily implies
that preventive patrol is directly proportional to the frequency of
crime occurrence, an assumption that is not clearly demonstrated. For
example, Richard Krouger's study on randomly moving patrol cars in
Houston, Texas, suggests that the probability of a police unit deterring a criminal act, given a specific location, is significantly
reduced when compared to the same police unit remaining in a
stationary position. 47 Then too, the controversial study conducted
in Kansas City in 1975 concluded that regular patrol of the streets by
uniform police in marked vehicles may not prevent crime. 48 It is
interesting to note, that Larson responded to the Kansas City experiment; again attempting to employ "probabi1istic models ••• to
estimate frequencies of preventative patrols and response times. 1I49
His critique was severely damaged by his use of faulty assumptions
(previously mentioned). Tony Pate, George L. Kelling, and Charles
Brown emphasize this point when they write, "Larson's models nor his
data are adequate to make statements about typical patrol intensities.
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in major American cities. IISO They base this strong statement on a
lengthy dissertation concerning the criticism of Larson's travel time
model and simulation-probability model.
In conclusion, since Larson's program is similar to LEMRAS, it
requires the continual updating of environmental, community, and
departmental factors to assess predictive trends. A procedure which
may be very costly and time consuming.
PCAM - Patrol Car Allocation Method. The patrol car allocation
method (PCAM) is a computer program designed to enable police departments to determine the number of patrol units to have on duty during
various times of the day.

It is based heavily on Larson's program,

with substantial improvements. The program was developed jointly by
the United States Department of Justice and Housing and Urban Development in 1975.

Its capabilities are described in the users manual by
Jan Chaiken and Peter Dormant. 5l
PCAM is a simple analytic model.

It provides two patrol per-

formance objectives--dispatch delay and response time.

For this

reason, it is frequently referred to as a performance-oriented system.
peAM is significantly different from previous programs in that it
does not attempt to equalize the calls for service workload across
watches or shifts.

Instead, its goal is to deploy officers so that

dispatch delays and response times (performance monitors) can be
optimized. PCAM has both descriptive and prescriptive capabilities.
It is very flexible and can specify particular allocations that best
meet the standards of performance established by individual users.
When operated descriptively, an evaluation of current patrol allocation can be assessed against the user-set performance indicators.
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When operated prescriptively, the program will recommend the "best"
temporal allocation of existing resources. The "best" allocation plan
can be defined by setting parameters for geographical commands, different times of the day or week, average number of calls placed in
queue, and the total dispatch and response times.
Unlike the simulation model proposed by Larson, PCAM is not based
on a randomly-moving patrol car assumption, nor does it hold constant
specific probability and gaming functions.

It is almost entirely con-

trolled by user input and user designation of performance monitors.
The natural limitation is contained in the number and type of parameters available. For instance, the model reflects no geographical
structure and is insensitive to the locations of patrol cars within a
specific area. Also, differences in crime rates, call for service
trends, and patrol densities are not easily augmented to the program.
For this reason, continual updating requires the user to write subsidiary computer programs; a costly and time-consuming procedure.
Further, PCAM maintains a simple dispatching model and is severely
limited to policies and guidelines which can be implemented. As an
example, PCAM fails to allow dispatching patrol cars across command
boundaries for high-priority calls. 52 A procedure which is quite
common and many times imperative in police deployment plans.
, The Shoup-Dosser Model - The Split Force Concept. Stemming once
again from the President's Commission on Crime and Law Enforcement in
1967, the Chicago Police Department, under the leadership of O. W.
Wilson, received an operations research grant to review uses of manpower in the patrol division. The result was an exhaustive project in
the Chicago Police Department which demonstrated the relevance and

20

potential value of a number of specific approaches. 53 The two
models proposed for the allocation of police resources and, that are
relevant to this study, involve the Shoup-Dosser model with the
Split-Force concept.
The principal author of this approach is Albert Bottoms, who
directed the Operations Research Task Force of the Chicago Police
Department.
The Shoup-Dosser model was first proposed in 1964 by Carl S.
Shoup and Douglas Dosser. 54 The model assumes that the city is
divided into two districts with corresponding average crime rates Zl
and Z2.

Further, it is assumed that the effectiveness of a patrol-

man is different in each district and that constant numbers Kl and
K2 are defined to accommodate these differences.

If t policeman are

aSSigned to district one, they will have effectiveness t Kl • The
larger t Kl , the greater the effectiveness of the t policeman in

police district one. The goal of police allocation is assumed to

increase the effectiveness of t Kl • Further, it is assumed that
when t policeman are aSSigned to district one, the average crime rate
is reduced to Zl/t Kl. Thus, the total average rate (under the
two district assumptions) for the city is: 55
Zl

Z2

t K1

(T-t)K2

-+--where: T represents a total number of patrolmen
Zl and Z2 represent average crime rates
K1 and K2 represent effectiveness in two police
districts
t represents number of policemen assigned to each district
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Of course, a much more refined and complicated model is produced
by Bottoms to distribute T policemen over a city with many police districts.

However, for the purposes of this study, the simpler equation

is adequate to explain the model.
Assuming that police officers have a quantifiable and direct
affect on the crime rate within a specific district, the model proposes a split-force concept. The ideal objective is to have (at any
given moment) the exact amount of response force needed to match the
demand for police service; and simultaneously have a preventive force
throughout the city in such a way as to minimize total criminal
activity.56 Thus, the patrol force is split into response and preventive duties.
The Chicago experience with the Shoup-Dosser Method can be highly
criticized on a number of theoretical pOints. Several assumptions are
made which are not clearly proven. First, the assumption that preventive uniform patrol has an effect on crime is speculative at best.
The Kansas City Preventive Patrol Experiment, as well as other recent
studies, indicate that uniform patrol may not alter crime activity in
a given district. 57 In furtherance of this issue, the Shoup-Dosser
model proposes that an increase in patrol capability alone directly
decreases crime. Once again, the Kansas City Preventive Patrol
Experiment challenges this contention. 58 However, the largest fault
in the model centers around the division of a city into separate districts wherein police productivity is measured in terms of arrests and
the recovery of stolen property.59 The model assumes that patrolmen
are equal in performing this productivity measure and, therefore,
"equal in effectiveness from man to man."60 This
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assertion is not founded in the literature. Contrarily, a number of
studies suggest that police behavior, as measured by either clearance
rates or arrest rates affect the crime rate independent of other
social factors.

In 1974, Tittle and Rowe found that the higher the
clearance rate the lower the total index crime rate. 61 While this
study was conducted only among cities and counties in Florida, it
certainly indicated that individual police style may effect crime.

In

support of this study, Charles Logan analyzed the relationship between
clearance rates and reported property crimes for five consecutive
years. He concluded that an inverse relationship existed. 62 And
finally, in a more comprehensive and detailed study, James Q. Wilson
and Barbara Boland investigated the effect of police practices on the
rate of robbery in 35 American cities. 63 They concluded that
statistical evidence supported the premise that individual police
behavior may affect crime rates. They state that "police may affect
crime rates less by how many of them are on patrol than by what they
do there. 64 This is in direct conflict with the Shoup-Dosser model
which asserts that a direct increase in t policeman will result in a
reduction of the average crime rate. 65
The Hypercube Queuing Model. The hypercube queuing model is one
of the latest and most advanced computer programs currently used in
police deployment tDday. Developed in 1975 by Richard Larsen, it
provides police managers with assistance in the design of individual
patrol beats. 66 The goal of the program is to provide information
about the ability of a patrol unit to answer service calls in various
patrol beats. Unlike traditional beat concepts where patrol units
answer calls only in assigned areas (except for emergencies), the
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hypercube design explores different aspects of dispatching strategy.
The program does not construct beat boundaries. Rather, it calculates
performance measures for various beat designs and, constructs hypothetical structures which match departmental parameters or needs. The
model is currently in use in Boston, Massachusetts.
The hypercube 'program is not a simulation.

It solves a set of

specific queuing equations that determine the steady-state probability
that any particular set of patrol cars is unavailable to be dispatched, while other units are availab1e. 67 In effect, the model
solves a finite set of equations based on the numerous possibilities
of different patrol units being unavailable for service c;.lls.
Further, the program determines a number of outputs based upon these
probability approximations, such as (1) equal workload among units,
(2) equal response times and travel times among units, (3) minimum
dispatches outside a beat, and (4) patrol frequency within each beat.
Obviously, a prerequisite to the use of hypercube modeling is a
jurisdiction which is divided into numerous reporting units.
The hypercube queuing model has a sound conceptual and mathematical base. As previously stated, it is not a simulation model but
produces calculations which are steadystate. This quality does
initiate a few drawbacks. First, the number of patrol cars must be a
fixed and constant number for each run of the program. Second, the
program is limited in addressing emergency and high priority calls for
service as the total number of units available at any given period of
time changes with reported activity. And third, being in a steadystate, the hypercube model cannot reflect changes in call rates,
environmental factors, and other characteristics over time without
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being reprogrammed. This updating feature can be costly and time
consuming.
Deployment Plans in General. The preceeding overview has
attempted to familiarize the reader with an historical evolvement of
police patrol allocation models.

No claim is made that all of the

published allocation designs have been scrutinized.

In fact, only

those studies and models which are well known and frequently cited
have been analyzed. There are numerous other designs which are rarely
mentioned in the literature.

For example, the St. Louis model has

initiated a spatially distributed queuing model; the methods proposed
by Larson have been segmented into an interactive approach and several
other probability methods; and the hypercube design has even been
altered into a program called "superbent."68 For the most part,
these other models have not been extensively used nor cited in the
literature.

For this reason they are placed in a footnote for the

purposes of this study.
One of the pronounced shortcomings of police patrol allocation
designs, in general, lies in the area of evaluation.

For the most

part, the evaluation of patrol deployment plans have not been well
developed and have failed to make use of experimental design. 69
What is required to further the advancement of patrol deployment is a
carefully designed experiment that measures the effect of innovations
in police strategies and schemes.

For example, very few of the noted

patrol allocation designs have even been implemented to measure what
the police actually did. 70 Instead, they attempted to measure the
effect of increased or decreased response times, elapsed times, police
presence, workload, calls for service, etc. Further, it is only
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recently that scientists are reviewing and critiquing patrol allocation plans based on the problems of what policemen actually do. Gary
W. Cordner offers an excellent advance in this direction as he
explores police patrol workload studies from an analysis of the police
role. 7l He identified a major shortcoming of the workload studies
based on the ambiguous nature of the patrol task.

Not only do police

spend about 50 percent of their time on free patrol (which is usually
ignored by allocation studies), but the effect of this free patrol as
a preventive measure is rarely discussed in terms of self-initiated
activity.72 The writer agrees with Wilson, Boland, Cordner, and
others who suggest future patrol allocation designs focus on the "subjective meanings" of patrol activities and the "capabi1ity of
individual police behavior." 73
Statement of the Problem
The state-of-the-art in patrol deployment design has progressed
in a step-by-step manner.

First, utilizing command discretion,

intuitive judgment, and rather simple analytic techniques in the early
1950's; to more advanced procedures using computer applications in the
late 1960's; to finally the total use of computer programming,
probability modeling, and beat designing in the late 1970's. Throughout this evolution of allocation models, there has been a consistent
set of limitations when applied to the needs of small urban centers.
First, the noted allocation designs have not addressed the issues
of small cities. They have historically been designed for large urban
centers, such as Los Angeles (hazard formula), St. Louis (LEMRAS),
Chicago (Shoup-Dosser), and Boston (hypercube queuing). These highly
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techn~cal

and computerized mathematical models have failed to address

the special needs of managing police in small urban centers--political
jurisdictions that account for 93 percent of the police departments in
the United States. 74 For example, small urban cities are often
characterized by unique local conditions such as cultural norms
exhibited in the South; or public expectations of political leaders
and government institutions; or particular economic capabilities of
wealthy suburban centers in the East. 75 This often means specific
idiosyncrasies for each small community

t~at

must be addressed in the

police allocation design. For instance, the police may provide
funeral escort service for their community. Although this might not
be a high priority service for patrol deployment, nevertheless, it can
be an important element for decision-making in that jurisdiction.
Failing to perform this service adequately might have negative
political and economic consequences when the police manager makes
budget requests.

In contrast, for the large metropolitan city, such a

service is usually not an issue.
Secondly, this lack of attention to unique local conditions
inhibits the use of current programming-type allocation models, such
as LEMRAS, simulation, PCAM, and hypercube queuing. A documented disadvantage to each of these models is the failure of the program to
readily adapt to a changing environment. A new city policy, a sharp
economic decline, a quick political turnover, or even a timely police
raid could drastically alter the predictive functions and workload
assessments of these sophisticated allocation models. Therefore, continual evaluating and updating of the program is required. Many
times, this task is very difficult as subsidiary programs must be
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written.

Then too, the community is always changing, causing
different demands, and affecting current workload patterns. 76
This issue is related to still another problem. While the recent
literature advances computerization as an affordable item for small

cities, there is a critical limit to the expense of operating such a
resource. 77 Surely, the continual monitoring and adapting of
various programs to environmental changes may exceed such a limit.
And then again, due consideration must be given to not only the
monetary output but also to the exhaustive time consumption needed to
fulfill such demands. Given these costs, it can be strongly argued
that such computer deployment techniques for urban police forces of
less than 150 sworn persons ;s not economical and may be dysfunctiona1. 78 The continued input of highly technical data for queuing
and probability models may be too sophisticated and too expensive for
the manpower deployment needs of small urban police departments.
Further, most small urban police administrators have not been
trained to think in terms of probability factors, queuing models, or
computer simulation techniques. Often the progeny of 20 years
longevity within a civil service system and having little formal
education, the small city police manager frequently views these
allocation designs as too complex and largely irrelevant to his needs.
, Finally, the large urban police allocation designs have not been
comprehensive; centering only on the deployment of uniform patrol
without adequately considering the allocation of personnel to other
police duties (i.e. investigation, supervision, etc.). The fiscal
restraints faced by most small urban police departments require
deployment models that consider the effective and efficient use of all
field officers.
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Thus, the current available manpower allocation models have not
met the specific needs of small urban centers on several points.
These are:

(1) the designs are too complicated and require costly

updating needs; (2) they are not comprehensive; (3) they fail to
accommodate unique and changing community conditions; and (4) the
allocation models do not address the local, decision-making elements
present in small cities.
This dissertation addresses this important problem by developing
a decision-making method for the determination of optimum police
patrol allocation design for urban centers having less than 100,000
population. This method will not emphasize prediction of calls for
service or probability calculations to determining patrol strength
given certain criteria. The deficiencies of these mathematical models
have already been discussed.

Rather, the focus of this study is on a

method for combining decision-making elements that will permit a
police manager to select and use certain criteria to equalize the
workload of patrol units and to assess alternative methods for
achieving optimum allocation design.
In addition to this practical contribution to the science of
police management, this study has theoretical implications regarding
the decision-making process in police organizations. By directly
applying decision-making theory to the "real-world" problem of police
manpower allocation, a new and innovative managerial technique will be
proposed. This also will serve as a source to direct inquiry for
future study.
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Review of the Literature
The literature dealing with decision-making in the police management field is not extensive, and most of it devoted to methods of
applying the decision-making process. While in theory it should be
easy to divide decision-making processes into discrete, conceptual
paradigms, in reality, it is extremely difficult to separate one
approach from another.
Further, there are as many definitions of decision-making as
there are organizational theorists in the various disciplines. To
overcome this difficulty, a definition of decision-making has been
chosen from the many that have been formulated that permits decisionmaking to be viewed as a dynamic and complicated process. That
definition, offered by Ira Sharkansky, is: "a process in which
choices of alternative courses of action" shape a desired outcome. 79 It contains several concepts that are directly related to
the general study of police management and the making of such specific
decisions as patrol allocation:

(1) decision-making is a process; (2)

decision-making involves the ability to make rational choices;

~3)

decision-making assumes a systematic methodology; and
(4) decision-making is conducted by human beings attempting to achieve
a desired consequence or result. These concepts (which are presented
in their general order of historical evolvement) provide an analytical
approach to reviewing the literature.
Decision-Making as a Process. Sam Sourya1 has identified a
pattern that he calls lithe microdynamics of decision-making. 1I80
Accurately displaying decision-making as a purposeful process which
requires intentional thinking, Souryal places extreme importance on
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three sub-systems: desireability, predictability, and probability.
Drawing the essence of his approach from Irwin Bross' design on
integrating past data with future outcomes, Souryal expresses that his
microdynamic model is the most useful in the absence of a mathematical
model; and he assumes that no mathematical model exists. 8l However,
this conflicts with probability models and simulation methods used in
operations research and by systems science (discussed later in this
chapter).

Even Bross' study is a structural model providing some
technical data for administrators. 82
While Souryal uses a contemporary policy analysis approach to
develop a continuous process capable of providing the manager with
insight into future outcomes, he fails to elaborate on the technology
necessary for useful predictions.

From a strict policy analysis view-

point, the process of decision-making should be concerned with
describing historical patterns, explaining them,

~r.d

developing recom-

mendations as to which patterns are desirable and how they might best
be achieved.

Further, and closely related to Souryal's predictive

approach, a decision-making method should be an intellectual response
that explains and describes the causes and consequences of administrative action with a heavy emphasis on the exploration and discovery of
new, innovative alternatives to solutions. These are not new concepts; Yehezkel Dror has been discussing policy-making and decisionmaking from a prescriptive point since the 1950's. 83
However, in support of Souryal's and Bross' concepts, a refreshing underlying theme emerges from the continual dialogue on "predictive techniques." While not openly stated, the models intimate that
decision-making is more than just following the numbers of plugging
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values into some mysterious, predictive formula.

Decision-making is

not only a cognitive process, it is an art. And as so eloquently
described by Aaron Wildavsky, decision-making, like policy analysis is
an imagination, a "thought experiment" that attempts to recognize
future contingencies in order to improve what may come to pass. 84
Futher, decision-making is prognostic.

Inherent in the process is the
ability to perceive future consequences of actions taken. 8S
Here then, is the essence of decision-making as a process; as a

continuous, dynamic, imaginative and intuitive procedure aimed at
understanding historical patterns, grasping current situations,
recognizing decision consequences, and perceiving future events.
Decision-making and Rational Choices. Considered the most
idealistic design developed in the area of decision-making, the
rational or normative model concentrates on the individual ability to
reason or compare alternative means to an end.
Herbert Simon explains that rational choices are made on a
"principle of efficiency.,,86 His famous model of rationality contends that there are three essential steps in decision-making; (1)
list all of the alternative strategies, (2) determine and calculate
all of the consequences to each strategy, and (3) evaluate all of
these consequences in a comparative fashion. 87 While Simon is given
cre~it

to the development of this approach, its comprehensive

expansion can be observed in the literature of several other
well-known theorists.

Peter Drucker's concept of the "Effective

Executive," N.F. Iannone's "style" in Supervision of Police Personnel,
and Sharkansky's development of Public Administration all exhibit an
expansion on SimonIs original work. 88 The rational model, now often
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referred to as the rational-comprehensive model in the above standard
works, sets forth a series of formalized steps toward "effective
decision-making.

il

These steps can be generally observed in each of the

cited studies and listed as follows:
1.

Identify and define the problem

2. Ascertain all information regarding the problem
3.

List all possible alternatives and means to solving the problem

4. Analyze the alternatives and assess the facts
5. Select the appropriate alternatives; find the answer.
It is obvious to observe the elaboration on Simon's original
method in each of these cases. The decision-making approach assumes an
ideal condition whereby the decision-maker is aware of all available
information related to the problem and has an unlimited amount of time
in which to explore and narrow down proposed alternatives by a
"rational" and comparative process. Unfortunately, the real world
rarely allows for the ideal.
Therefore, highly criticized for being too idealistic and irrelevant to the administrative functions of a police organization, the
rational decision-making model has been subjected to harsh theoretical
reviews.

Interestingly, many of these criticisms were noted as

limitations by the proponent in the original method.
Sha~kansky

For instance,

provided a detailed discussion of "road blocks" to the

fulfillment of the rational-comprehensive model in practical administration. 89 He documented constraints in the collection of all available data and emphasized contingencies in the human ability to make
decisions. Additionally, Simon elaborated on the concept of a
"rational man."
tions, he stated:

Noting that man was "bounded" by a triangle of limita-
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On one side,
reflexes which
a second side,
conceptions of
and on a third
knowledge that

the individual is limited by those skills, habits, and
are no longer in the realm of the conscious ••• on
the individual is limited by his values and those
purpose which influence him in making decisions •••
side, the individual is limited by the extent of his
is relevant to his job. 90

It is apparent that Simon not only understood the decision-making
process but also the "human" factors associated in the term
"rationality." A prerequisite to "effective" decision-making is an
acute awareness of the social, environmental, and organizational
demands placed on the administrator. Simon accurately stresses that
man's ability to make rational decisions is bounded by the limitation
of his knowledge of the total organization. 9l From this critical
observation, he formulates a modified rational-comprehensive idea
entitled, "bounded rationality.,,92 The emphasis, of course, is on
man's inherent limitations to make decisions.
Another approach concerning the modification of rational decisionmaking is "incremental" and "muddling through" theories explored by
Charles Lindblom. 93 Based on his study of governmental institutions
in the United States, Lindblom states that the decision-making process
is so fragmented and so complex, incorporating the interaction of
various institutions, political entities, pressure groups, and
individual biases that rationality can have only a marginal or "incremental" affect. Lindblom asserts that decision-making is serial, that
it is limited by time and resources, as it gropes along a path where
means and ends are not distinct, where goals and objectives are
ambiguous, and where rationality serves no purpose. Contending that
managers and administrators "play things safe" and opt to move very
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slowly (incrementally) in decision-making, Lindblom proposes that
managers "muddle through" problems rather than analytically choose
decisions. 94 Lindblom's ideas have support, if not in theory, at
least in practice, as many police managers find them to be "a description of rea1ity."95
Thus, the decision-making method has been proposed by Simon and
others, and to some extent even Lindblom, to be a process of choice
based on a rational comparison of alternatives.

Highly criticized for

being too ideal, they ironically provide the basic theoretical foundations for the third set of models to be studied--those involving a
systemic approach to alternative measures.
Decision-making Assumes a Systematic Methodology.

Introduced in

the early 1950's as "general systems theory" by Ludwig Von Berta1anffy,
his model emphasizes a system which maintains a constant state while
the surrounding environment is changing (so-called dynamic equilibrium).96 Using any living organism as an example, Bertalanffy's
concept is based on "organization and wholeness" in the accomplishment
of a number of goa1s. 97 The important aspect of the early systems
approach is that it conceptualizes a system as a static entity.

In

this sense, an "organism" or an organization is t'epresented as a
self-maintaining structure, one which can reproduce. Such an analysis
hints at the type of framework useful as a systems theory for
decision-making one which is developed as a system of systems and that
can focus attention at the proper points in the organization for
rational maneuvering, both from the standpoint of the organization and
the environment.
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Anthony Wilden provides an exceptional categorization of the
systems approach in which the non-developmental, structure maintaining,
and consistent system is labeled "homeostatic."98 Wilden's typographic label implies a sequential stepping of events between organization and environment in which change occurs linearly and independently.
The scientific-management movement of the early 1960's utilized
the concept of the man-machine system (cybernetics) to re-emphasize the
organization and the environment as separate distinctions, dependent on
a static interplay for goal achievement.

It was not until Magorah

Maruyama's classic call for a second cybernetics, in 1963, that the
concept of "mutuality" was introduced. 99 His profound idea initiated
an alterating interaction between organization and environment, or an
action/reaction exchange.

It was at this point that the concept of

system with environment versus system in environment became
apparent. 100
This conceptual change resulted in a relatively widespread
re-evaluation of managerial approaches and decision-making techniques.
Recognizing the ideal organization must act "in harmony" with the
environment, proponents such as Daniel Katz and Robert Kahn shifted the
focus of system science to the organization as an open-ended, social
sub-system. 101 The concept studied the organization from within, as
a social device for efficiently accomplishing, through group means,
some stated purpose. Hence, the social-system school evolved from two
independent participants (the organization and the environment), to the
study of interpersonal relationships, human b2havior, and informal/
formal patterns of organization within an environment. Moreover, this
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organization or enterprise was recognized as subject to external
pressures from the cultural, economic, social, political, and
physiological surroundings.

In effect, the theoretical concerns of the

systems approach asserted that any organization could be studied as a
distinct subsystem, within the social structure of society, having a
specific function and objective. 102
Relating this approach to law enforcement agencies, the police
system can be viewed as a part of an integral set of components that
work together for an overall goa1. 103 It is a part of a larger
environmental system.
In this sense, the systems approach is similar to the rational
model previously described as they both contend:
1. There is a lack of agreement regarding the objectives of the
police system (especially concerning manpower allocation).
2. There is a lack of knowledge of alternative means for accomplishing goals, either within or outside the system.
3. There is a lack of agreement defining the criteria of performance, and;
4. There is a lack of knowedge of transfer functions which would
enable the prediction of outcomes from any given set of
inputs. 104
Basically, the systems approach is a derivative of the rationa1comprehensive model.

It is a framework for complex problem-solving,

emphasizing hierarchies of systems and their inter-relationships.

For

the most part, the systems method attempts to define objectives and
give some sense of order or structure to the solving of problems aimed
at accomplishing those objectives.

37

A system can be defined as a set of objects and all the relationships that exist between the objects. All systems are composed of
sub-systems and are members of a higher system. 105 For example, the
police system is in part, a member of the criminal justice system,
which is a part of the social system of America within which our
societies exist. The police system, in turn, is a set of sub-systems.
Following World War II, the systems approach segmented into a
technique vastly influenced by large, complex systems of variables.
The application, collection, and analysis of data for decision-making
within the organization was called "operations research."106 In
response to a need for a management-science which addressed complex
problems involving many variables, such as government planning,
military spending, natural resource conservation, and national defense
budgeting, operations research employed the use of mathematical
inquiry, probability theory, and gaming theory to "calculate the
probable consequences of alternative choices" in decisionmaking. 107 As a result, techniques such as Program Evaluation and
Review Technique (PERT) and Planning, Programming, and Budgeting
Systems (PPBS) were developed for use in managerial planning,
forecasting, and decision-making. 108 By their very nature, these
techniques must structure the system for analysis by quantifying
system elements. This process of abstraction often simplifies the
problem and takes it out of the real world. Hence, the solution of
the problem may not be applicable in the actual situation.
PERT and PPBS are managerial attempts to convert the disorganized
resources of men, machines, and money into a useful and effective
enterprise by which alternatives to problem-solving can be assessed.
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This process is conducted by a cost-effective analysis or an estimation for each alternative of the costs that would be incurred and the
extent to which the objectives would be attained.
This approach is again, a highly sophisticated elaboration of the
rational model utilizing quantitative techniques in the cost-effective
relationship. The weakness of the method is in its practicality to
real world situations where time and resources are not directly
structured to gather intelligence about every problem and possible
alternative. Further, it also assumes that human biases will not
enter the decision-making process. The most critical aspect of the
approach appears to be in its overriding insistance that decisionmaking is not a human activity but the product of some scientific,
computerized and unimpressionable robot that digests quantitative
information in return for "calculated responses.

1I

Aaron Wildavsky has continually warned that the application of
decision-making to costs, benefits, resources, and budgets frequently
formulates the adoption of meaningless data and places an unwarranted
stimuli into the process. 109 The danger may be that decision-making
might decrease its intellectual content at the expense of practical
impact.
The last decade has produced a significant change in the systems
approach to management and decision-making. Stemming from the human
relations concept, the new systems literature centers on explaining
both the behavior of organizations and the behavior of people within
organizations amid a changing environment. The shift from large, complex organizations and systems to small groups is noted in the
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plethora of studies aimed at improving managerial style and technique. Sensitivity training, interaction modeling, leadership
profiiing, group dynamics, communicJtion workshops, motivation
therapy, and job satisfaction studies are all relatively recent contributions to this body of knowledge. The goal of this human
relations perspective is to harmonize the organization with the
objective and methods of managerial decision-making. Hence, the
application of theories and perspectives advanced by Etzioni, Likert,
MacGregor, Drucker, Argyris, Odiorne, Shein, and Katzell address
managerial and decision-making behavior within the organization. 110
Although these bodies of knowledge are worthwhile contributions, they
have not provided a lasting solution to the continuing disparity
between satisfaction and acceptable organizational experiences on the
one hand and rapidly changing environmental conditions on the other.
Today's managers and decision-makers must attempt to balance these
internal and external conditions. Warren Bennis captures this thought
in his work on adapting to change. lll
This tenuous concept of the "organization in a state of ferment"
has led to a new level of decision-making ability--the concept of
learning through environmental evolution. 112 The literature in this
area lends itself to the planning process as described in Gregory
Bateson's work. 113 He formulates a series of developmental steps in
which the process of change is adapted to through individual learning.

Edgar Dunn takes this concept of learning by evolution and moves

beyond the individual and organization to the overall system. 114
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Implying a much higher degree of complexity to his model, Dunn states
that learning through change is not linear or serial.

Instead, he

proposes that new behavior, new structure, new rules, and subsequently
new conditions arise from pre-existing ones through a process of
transformation. 115 The important element of Dunn's model can be
seen in its comparison to earlier systems approaches. Dunn's "transformation" concept emphasizes that systems are not static (as compared
to Wilden's classification of homeostatis and sequential stepping of
events). According to Dunn, the organization and the individual
survive by their ability to adapt and evolve within the social
system.

Learning is inventive and creative on the part of human

beings; it is a cognitive ability for modifying present conditions
under changing circumstances. 116
This concept is elaborated on by Friedman, Michaels, and Schon
who contribute to the theoretical argument of social learning by
focusing on real world examples. 117 Friedman's study on the role of
the planner in a mutual learning transaction with clients superficially touches the real processes by which organizations, institutions, and societies transform themselves within a changing environment. Michaels concept of planning and change addresses this issue in
much more detail. Emphasizing that shifts in social norms and
structures (as well as technological innovations) require change in
personal, interpersonal, functional, and managerial aspects of
organizational life; Michael advocates the implementation of "longrange social planning."118 From a theoretical pOint, Michael
expands on Dunn's concept of organizational transformation.

Noting

that social shifts have historically been reactive, unanticipated, and

41
uncontrolled, Michael proposes a plan for "directed se1ftransformation" for the organization and society.119 Michael

views

his learning process as a societal movement toward learning how to
adapt to change. 120 Basically, he proposes a reciprocal concept
between organizational and environmental learning. The organization
learns how to change with the environment as the environment is
adapted to accommodate the organizational change. Through mutual
feedback, in times of uncertainty and turbulence, Michaels stresses
that change in structure and norms can occur "so as to make the consequences rewarding" for both the environment and the organization. 121
Donald Schon argues that the organization must become "a learning
system" decentralizing control and abandoning pragmatic models of
p1anning. 122 Contending that institutions and organizations respond
to the threat of change by stagnate reluctance or "dynamic conservatism," he proposes that strategic learning, intervention, and forecasting be employed so that necessary action can be taken to allow for
future contingencies. 123 Schon views the world as a dynamic, turbulent environment threatening public and governmental institutions
who refuse to change. His solution is not in adaptation, like
Michael, but is based on the structural change of institutions to
define themselves in terms of "functional systems."124 In this
manner, specificity is lost and the linking of previously separated
components is achieved, thereby, producing new "networks."125 It is
under the pressures of change that these "networks" are forced to rely
on each other and subsequently become learning systems to facilitate
the decision-making process.
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Although criticized for being unsubstantive and failing to
address a specific and qualitative goal in future planning; the works
of Friedman, Michael, and Schon offer a different perspective to the
traditional systems approach to decision-making. They establish new
vistas which involve the individual as a integral part of the organization to cope with change.

It is the emphasis on the individual

which highlights the final point in this literature review.
Decision-making is a Human Attempt to Attain Goals.

In an

opposing concept to rationality and logic, William Gore identifies the
crucial element of humanism in decision-making. He presents a
"heuristic model" appropriately referred to as lithe gut level
approach" when considering the police organization. 126 The seasoned
patrol officer frequently refers to an unknown quality or phenomena
known as "mocksie" or the ability to be "street-wise." This unknown
dimension is captured in Gore's decision-making method for
administrators.

In an antithesis to the rational model, Gore provides

a mechanism by which a decision is the product of the maker's
personality.

In a quotation from his book, Gore views the heuristic

process lias a groping toward agreements seldom arrived at through
logic ••• the very essence of those factors validating a decision
are internal to the personality of the individual instead of external
to it." 127 While the rational method is concrete, formalized by
structure and calculations; the heuristic concept is nebulous, characterized by "gut feelings reaching backward into the memory and forward
into the future." 128
Applauded for its contribution to the decision-making process,
Gore's approach is also highly criticized as being too simplistic and
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non-scientific.

Sam Sourya1 writes that "Gore's analysis is too

unreliable.

it could complicate existing situations, promote

spontaneity, discredit the role of training, and delay the advent of
professiona1ism" in police organizations. 129
This is an unfair assessment of the method. Gore views heuristic
applications as adjuncts or alternatives to rational models. Further,
some type of credibility must be asessed to that vague, unknown, and
non-measurable entity we call "experience," "ta1ent," or the "sixth
sense."

It was this element that Simon had so much trouble with in

calculating his "bound and 1imited" argument regarding the rational
model.

In any event, Gore's contribution remains as a paradoxical

antinomy to decision-making based solely on figures, formulas, and
mathematical designs.
The last decade has seen the emergence of yet another aspect
toward heuristic decision-making. Research on commisurotomized brain
patients (those whose brains have been surgically split) has received
considerable attention in the psychophysiology literature. The issue
being raised concerns the delineation of brain hemispherical functions
in relation to intuition. Roger Sperry's experiments infer that there
are two distinct, information-processing systems respective to each
brain hemisphere. He states that "there appears to be two modes of
thinking, verbal and nonverbal, represented rather separately in left
and right hemispheres, respective1y.1I130 Michael Gazzaniga
elaborates on this distinction by studying cross-quing and
interference of one hemisphere to the other. 131 When the right side
responds to a task unknown by the left and the left is asked why the
response is made, it often guesses.

It needs a reason for
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behavior--reason does not always direct behavior but reality is
interpreted and rationalized after the fact based on responses to
it. 132 Since the right hemisphere does not have language, it is
suggested that intuition may be the non-verbal knowledge of the right
promoting acceptance or rejection of the data of the left. 133 What
is known about the right hemisphere is not conclusive. However, the
concept that it may derive at an answer to a question from a wider,
more detailed, and more specific base of information than aware to the
cognitive functions of an individual is highly conceivable. To the
area of decision-making, this type of research holds a fascinating key
to unlocking the door of "gut-level H or "sixth sense"

rat~onality.

Summary. The preceding discussion has reviewed the literature on
decision-making methods. There appears to be a wide variety of
concepts and an indefinite opinion as to which approach explains what
decisions. One of the noted experts on theoretical modeling is Thomas
Dye.

Indicating that the purpose of a model is to explain, clarify,

or simplify the understanding of a governmental, political, or
administrative process, he suggests that models and methods are not
competitive. 134 Therefore, no one idea can be judged "best." Each
one provides a separate focus on the decision-making process.
It is the purpose of this study to design a new method for
decision-making as applied to police patrol allocation. The theoretical importance here is that the method to be presented will
integrate the four identified focal pOints of decision-making:
1. decision-making is a process (Souryal, Dror, and Wi1davsky)
2. decision-making involves the ability to make rational choices
(Simon, Iannone, and Sharkansky)
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3. decision-making assumes a systematic methodology (Quade,
Wilden, Nillsson, Dunn, Michael, and Schon)
4. decision-making is conducted by human beings attempting to
achieve desired goals (Gore, Sperry, and Gazzaniga)
For this reason, the review of literature has been confined to a
general

ovs~view,

segmented into a categorization which provides an

easy and uncomplicated manner in which to study decision-making
models.

In the next chapter, the fundamental design and theoretical

framework of this new decision-making technique will be explained.
This innovative method marks the major advancement proposed in this
treatise.
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CHAPTER II
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK:

INTEGRATED MANAGEMENT DECISION-MAKING

The great advances made since World War II in both the theory and
practice of organizational behavior have done much to raise the quality
of managerial decision-making. Unfortunately, most of it has not yet
been recognized by many police managers.
In the preceding chapter, four distinct yet related theoretical
advances were identified decision-making is:

(1) a process, (2) a

rational ability, (3) a systematic methodology, and; (4) a human
endeavor. The one key element to which each of the different authors
prescribed is that decision-making is dynamic.

It is continually

changing, and what may be current today will soon be outdated. Nowhere is this phenomena more clearly stated than in the writings of
Alvin Toffler--Future Shock and The Eco-Spasm Report. l Each of these
works strongly indicate that traditional organizational structures and
managerial decision-making practices are crumbling under the impact of
accelerating changes in technology, social values and norms, and the
amount of knowledge available. 2 These, and many other writings,
clearly warn students of management techniques to concentrate on
advanced concepts that attempt to avoid future problems. Just emerging
as an academic discipline is the study known as "futuristics." Its aim
is to develop specific planning, forecasting, and control techniques in
order to cope with future contingencies.
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Here then, is a major emphasis of an integrated approach to
decision-making: to be able to survive and adapt to rapid change, to
be flexible and prescriptive.

In order to fulfill such a mission, a

necessary quality for success must be in the integrative measures taken
between organization and environment and between theorist and
practitioner.
Further, the four theoretical perspectives that have been reviewed
are in no way contradictory one to another; rather they are mutually
compatible, with considerable overlap between them. Each theory
stresses certain aspects of decision-making and neglects others.
Logically then, an integration of these four considerations should
present a relatively complete and innovative approach.
A Decision-Making Model
The decision-making process does not emerge immediately and
clearly like a new rose budding in May, but gradually and steadily in
a growing manner. Similar to Lindblom's "serial" concept of policymaking, decision-making occurs in a somewhat sequential form. 3 However, instead of viewing decision-making as a progressive "mudding
through" concept, it should be analyzed in terms of a specific
response-action behavior. That is not to say that there are neatly
detailed, refined and specific steps which are followed in coming to
choice, but rather, that there are indeed a series of nebulous stages
which form a behavioral framework to decision-making. These stages
can be identified and discussed in terms of a response-action behavior.
Herbert Simon's concept of decision-making built on a principle
of "phases," or Craig Lundberg's thoughts on decision-making
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c1asses," or William Gorels projections of "strategic parts," or

Edmund Quadels uses of "structura1 techniques," were all attempts to
classify these general "stages" in the decision-making process. 4
All are analogous to a set of rather undefined and. loosely connected
behaviors within the decision-making process. These are:

(1) problem

recognition or awareness, (2) analyzing or doing something with information, and (3) formulating a choice.
Figure 1 provides a schematic view of decision-making as proposed
by this dissertation.

It should be emphasized that each stage does

not represent a stringently defined and quickly visible step.
Instead, the decision-making process is viewed as a series of
response-action stages where clear lines of demarcation are not known
nor are they relevant to the overall process. The important features
are the integrated capabilities diagrammed between the environment and
the organization.
One of the fundamental problems exhibited in other attempts to
describe the decision-making process is in exactness. This is
especially true in many of the systems approaches. There appears to
be a set of rigid and firm boxes into which and out of which come
exact issues and answers.

Integrated Management Decision-Making

(IMDM) is a direct attempt to alleviate this persistence.
Decision-making cannot be viewed as a highly definable process with
quantifiable inputs and calculable outputs.

Instead, it is a very

ambiguous and vague concept of an organizational behavior. Any
attempt to measure or quantify the variables associated within this
problem-solving process is extremely difficult, if not impossible. 5
Additionally, one of the essential features for futuristic-oriented
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approaches in decision-making is flexibility.

The model must be able

to mold and conform to different contingencies and exogenous factors
influencing the outcome. For example, any decision conducted by a
public organization or administrator must be responsive and cognizant
of political pressures.

In short, most decisions involve a great deal

of negotiation and persuasion rather than pure rationality.
Each of the "stages" comprising IMDM can be related to a
response-action activity. This activity must center on information
flow between stages, and between the environment and the organization.

Communication and continual feedback is the backbone of IMDM.
This model represents a new method for simultaneously increasing

communication, understanding, development of options, and a course of
action between the organization and the environment.

It is a dual-

involvement perspective characterized by cognitive processes within
the organization.

It necessarily requires the ability to assess

information, to plan ahead, to learn, and to adapt. These features
are in contrast to the analytical and instrumental quantification
approaches proposed in the past. 6
Integrated Management Decision-Making can be characterized by the
following practices!

(1) It views the organization both as a system

with its own subsystems and as a subsystem of a larger environmental
system; (2) it takes a holistic approach, using techniques that emphasize the interrelationships among component stages; (3) it stresses
flexibility and changing organizational structures; and (4) it
attempts to strengthen the human aspect or input within the process.
The following discussion attempts to focus on each stage of the model,
highlighting the characteristics and advantages of the overall
technique.
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Articulation of the Problem. The concept of accurate and precise
problem identification has plagued decision-making theorists for sometime.

Recognized as the "beginning phase" for the decision-making

process by Herbert Simon back in 1960, this critical and initiatory
stage involves much more than simple "awareness."7 Donald Schon's
Displacement of Concepts emphasizes this step as a behavior. 8
Pointing out that people can only describe a problem in the language
and terms that are understandable in their own respective world, Schon
characterizes the identification of a problem as a shift in conceptual
thinking. 9 Linking the problem to "what was once working" and to
what is now the "beginning" instead of the "old," a problem recognition involves a specific organizational action to an internal or
external pressure. 10 Thus, an organization exists in a state of
suspended animation until some force comes to bear, initiating an
action from the organization to define a problem in its own language
and within its own contextual framework.

Of course, the inherent

fault lies in the perception of a problem. What an external or
internal force conceives to be a problem may indeed be quite different
from what the organization articulates to be the problem. The major
crux of what is supposed to be a problem is lost when interpreted from
the organizational reference. Thus, problem misconception can be constroed as a difference in interpretation based on individual
references both internal and external to the organization. These misconceptions make problem identification and articulation less valid
and many times spurious in content.
C. West Churchman elaborates further on this issue.

Indicating

that we all make an incorrect beginning in viewing problems by
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describing them "in terms of structure," Churchman advocates a complete change in thinking. 11 Instead of conceptualizing by means of
description and structure, we should consider function and purpose.
Perhaps the greatest strengthening for decision-making can come in
this area.

If we think in terms of structure, we naturally limit our-

selves to the capabilities and capacities of our own point of
reference; we cannot transgress the boundaries of our own, single
environment, if we only think description. What is needed is to
emphasize "central objectives;" to plan ahead in terms of specific
accomplishments. 12 This attention to objectives and strategies
would help:

(1) to keep decision-making consistently focused rather

than going off in many directions, which often produces failure; (2)
to ensure that the specific decision techniques are harnessed to serving a meaningful purpose that are well thought out; (3) to plan for
future contingencies, problems, and failures; and (4) to reduce
problem misconception by clearly articulating objectives that are
operationally clear and universally understood.
Thus, a shift can be seen as a change from describing a problem
to stating an objective.

It makes no difference what the problem is,

if we agree on a course of action in response to the demand.

For

example, there exists an economic and political pressure on police
organization to effectively and efficiently deploy patrol personnel
within a limited budget.

It is irrelevant if different interest

groups define this as a problem in wasting governmental time and
money, or a threat to crime control, or a burden to specific city
locations. The important point lies in defining an objective to meet
this need; such as allocation through equalized workload.
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Implementation. Once such an objective is discovered, the second
stage of the decision-making process is entered, that of implementation.

It is critical that the issue of definition be highlighted in

this process. That is, what exact intentions and events are to be
accomplished. Pressman and Wildavsky have noted that the act of
implementation is a process within itself, and that the environmental
arena of implementation may be so intense that goals and objectives
become vague, ambiguous, or 10st.1 3 In other words, implementation,
often times, accelerates the loss of definition.
Further, implementation is indeed a process.

It can be viewed as

a complex staging of events within the overall decision-making arena.
Implementation focuses on the application of an objective to the
environment. This may require the political or economic or cultural
maneuvering of numerous and diverse elements, actors, and forces to
accomplish an end result. The important aspect to consider is that
implementation both expresses conflict and creates it; and that within
every movement aimed at reducing a problem, there is an associated
risk of actually making matters worse. Therefore, implementation does
not just apply an objective, it produces change. And as Pressman and
Wildavsky have so eloquently indicated, each step of the implementation process may "geometrically grow" as other issues or problems or
crisis are caused. 14 For this reason, organizations must adopt a
decision-making model that is flexible and able to withstand buffeting
by a constantly shifting set of environmental factors.

Implementation

involves the ability of an organization to apply an objective to the
environment. This requires not only flexibility, but also futuristic
insight; like planning and visualizing future situations, making

67

estimates of what will happen at each step of the process, identifying
the issues and potential danger points, analyzing the different ways
and means for reaching desired goals through the least resistive path;
and initiating action in time to prepare what may be needed to cope
with changing conditions and contingent events.
The recent literature concerning implementation indicates that
many of these same concepts have been identified regarding change and
complexity within the process.

Jan Huyman writes that the extreme

confusion regarding the meaning of the term implementation necessitates a "provisional working definition."15 Douglas Bunker suggests
that the key to understanding implementation is to "identify the
significant interaction points and actors" of the process. 16 Donald
Van Meter and Carl Van Horn stress further that the critical imp ortance within the implementation process is in "calculating the amount
of change" that will occur. 17 And finally, Eugene Bardack simulates
the process of implementation to a type of "gamesmanship" in which the
organization attempts to maneuver elements necessary for accomplishing
goals and objectives while still surviving in a turbulent and
uncertain environment. 18
To this point, implementation has been discussed as causing
change in the environment. However, it also causes change within the
organization. Essentially, implementation is a response to an
action. The purpose of the process is to apply an objective to the
environment after a specific action (problem) has been defined. What
needs to be emphasized is that change must concurrently happen in the
organization to successfully accomplish or carry-out its own
decision. Thus, implementation causes change in both the environment
and the organization.
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Organizational-Environmental Learning. The third transitional
stage in Integrated Management Decision-Making involves another process within itself; that of learning. To this point, the environment
has not been fully defined from an organizational perspective.

It can

be considered the "independent cluster of persons, groups, organizations, political parties, and so forth, to which the organization must
respond. 1I19 The tenuous relationship between organization and
environment is circular and active.

In a sense, this relationship is

characterized by an organizational action which is absorbed by the
environment in the assumption that a beneficial change will
occur. 20 For all practical purposes this exchange of information
and activity can be described as organization-environmental learning.
Traditionally, this exchange of information has been assumed to
be fragmental and sequential. However, the recognition of a systems
design involving continual exchange of information between the two
entities of organization and environment explore two main themes:

(1)

learning is a central subject for planning and decision-making, making
the process "non-linear" (i.e. acting upon structures rather than
variables of systems) and simultaneous in its general approach; and
(2) learning is non-deterministic, future-creative, and places
emphasis on adaptation and invention through forecasting. 21
The concept of organization-environmental learning as a continuous and dynamic exchange of information is not new. There is considerable overlap here, with the recent writings of social planners
such as Friedmann, Jantsch, Friend and Jossop, Kahn, Schon, and
Michae1. 22 Friedmann expresses this concept best in his essay on
comprehensive urban planning; "mutua1 learning involves a symbiosis
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(between organization and environment) ••• that should go beyond a
single interaction and extend to a continual relationship ••• that
explores alternative futures for decision-making. 23
However, this perspective describes the ideal in organizationenvironmental learning. All too often, a variety of barriers exist
which impede this process from being effective or continuous. A discussion of these restraints and blockades is essential in the study of
organization-environmental learning.
First, according to Michael, the assumption of a passively
responding environment versus an active and dynamic environment led to
the belief that human relations were "naturally" of a hierarchial
order. 24 Sociological studies by Weber, Mills, and Marx supported
this hypothesis. 25 Further, this perspective has been abetted by
our language structure, which implicitly assign, cause and effect,
subject and predicate, and thereby implicitly treats social systems as
if they were "naturally" linear rather than circular in process. 26
However, if we explore the writings of Warren Bennis and Chris
Argyris, a much different perspective is argued. 27 Social systems
are circular. The future, according to Bennis, will be characterized
by a distribution of power and authority, a separation of management
from ownership, and an "integration" of organizational goals with
environmental demands and individual needs. 28 Argyris echoes these
same observations in his work as he suggests that "any organization
that is structured in a pyramidal form" will create a social system
that is indeed impersonal and linear. However, he strongly advocates
that "interpersonal incompetence" is sustained by these structures of
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linearity within an organization that is characterized by stagnation. 29 Bennis and Argyris research into the interpersonal-personal
behavior of organizational life emphasizes that social systems are not
"naturally" linear but circular, that vertical-horizontal structures
are functions of bureaucratic strategy, and that human effectiveness
increases as involvement and dynamic interpersonal growth increases
between individuals. 3D The point is that organizations, all too
often, prohibit learning because of their "non-human-oriented" structure, which facilitates the concept of linear versus circular
relationships.3l
Another barrier to organization-environmental learning stems from
this same structural problem, and involves information flow or communication. Since the processing and analyzing of information is a
ncessary prerequisite to learning, it seems only natural that the processes by which information is transmitted and received be conceptually clear and distinct. However, most organizations fail to either
send or receive such transmissions. The problem can be seen as one of
perception, confused by structure. This treatise previously discussed
the inherent problems of misconceptions in communication because of
reference groups or reference points. However, consider the complications of preconceived reputations or hidden agendas or lack of trust
between sender and receiver. These foregoing factors influence the
arena of communication because of structure. 32 Hierarchial
relationships within organizations dictate speCific, preconceieved
assumptions; such as information and "orders" flow from top to bottom
or from superior to subordinate. Communication involves effective
receiving as well as sending. Consider an outside interest group
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attempting to receive information from a bureaucratic establishment.
What factors effect communication? Surely, attention must be paid to
the Ic1imate" or the "timing" of the communique to be effective. 32
Organization-environmental learning is predisposed to effective communication.

If communication is considered directional rather than

interactive, then learning is severely restrained.

Both the organiza-

tion and the environment must interact to effectively address the
issues of change and implementation.
Identifying the involvement of interdisciplinary approaches in
social learning, Magorah Maruyama focuses on another issue in communication. 33 He states that there exists three paradigms among
planners: one-way causal (hierarchists), random-process (individualists), and mutual causal (mutualists). These paradigms stem from
basic philosophical, epistemological, and scientific roots of various
origins which form the basis of individual perceptions, behavior, and
views. Analyzing these paradigms from an organization-environmental
learning perspective, it is easy to understand that these different
paradigms perceive one another to be illogical, unintelligent and even
deceptive. Maruyama concludes that communication between the
paradigms is severely limited, if not impossible. 34 Once again,
what appears to be differences in references complicates the flow of
information and hence, retards organization-environmental learning.
Another of the natural barriers to change is resistance. Robert
Chin has elaborated on this theme in his analysis of the systems
model. Reporting that most organizations wish to view themselves as
stable, existing within a uniform and consistent environment, Chin
advances his concept of "stationary equilibrium. 1I35 He proposes
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that systems in equilibrium react to external or internal impingements, disturbances, or changes by refusing to acknowledge their
existence. Remembering Wilden's classification of homeostatis, Chin
believes that resistance can be further advanced by simply "bringing
into operation those forces that restore or re-create a balance." 36
Donald Schon's idea of "dynamic conservatism" is analogous to this
concept. 37 Describing a world where organizations refuse to change
or adapt to the dynamic environment, Schon proposes that "systems
learn to become capable of transforming themselves." 38 If they do
not, then a crisis of disruption or continual conflict occurs between
organization and environment in which institutions, business firms,
public establishments, and private enterprises loose personal
identify, legitimacy, and confidence. The natural result is chaos
"beyond the stable state. 1I39
Thus, inherent to the decision-making process, is a stage of
learning whereby information must freely flow between and within
organization and environment. This communication of ideas and information must transcend those barriers described and essentially
integrate organizational and environmental change.
Adaptation. The crucial element of Integrated Management
Decision-making is indeed integration.

It occurs between the stages

of learning and adaptation, where change is most pronounced and most
identifiable.

Integration at this pOint, would accentuate the

requirements for effective matching of the organization to its
environment through internal restructuring. This is mutual adaptation.

In suppprt of this concept, Michael writes:
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Of the utmost importances with more informational exposure (from
the organization) to the environments the environment would be perceived as itself differentiated and integrated into a variety of
patterns according to the appreciative settings in the organization
and among members and groups in the environment that influence the
organization. 40
In other words s integration is an ideal process within decisionmaking whereby the adaptive and learning stages between organization
and environment become one.

It still remains theoretically important

to delineate these two stages in order to describe a singular restructuring of either the organization or the environment; independent of
one another. What Schon describes as the loss of the stable state is
this singular change.

IMDM proposes to facilitate mutual aggregation

through clarifying and displaying the decision-making process as a
behaviors and a product of the organization-environmental system.

In

this manners the model proposes that organizational structures are
decision-making strategies designed to achieve specific objectives.
Argyris' comments are extremely supportive at this time:
The structure of the organization is a snapshot or static picture
of the dynamics of the strategy being used. From our point of views
(a decision-making) strategy that optimizes the organizational core
activities of achieving the objectives maintaining the organization,
and adapting to the environment is the best strategy.41
Therefore s decision-making is essentially restructuring the
organization to fit the environment and vise-versa. The processes of
adaptation and learning are those stages which allow each entity to
cope with change in an order1ys methodica1 s and controlled way.

In

this manner, Integrated Management Decision-Making can be viewed as an
educational strategy in response to change. Taking on an organizational development feature, IMDM facilitates a "change in beliefs,
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attitudes, values, and structures of organizations so that they can
better adapt to new technologies, markets, challenges, and the
dizzying rate of change ifself .1142
Information Feedback. The final stage in the decision-making
process is information feedback.

It is through this crucial looping

of information that a system evaluates where it is in terms of where
it intends to go.

It is the means by which evaluation takes place,

where error is detected and "thereby it provides the basis from
learning how to get from here to there through changes in performance
that result in successive reductions in error. 1I43 Of central importance for decision-making, feedback also provides the information
needed to assess the current state of organization-environmental
balance.

In this manner, feedback provides the mechanisms, for revis-

ing definitions of the present, along with the means for linking them
with future actions.
Effective information feedback focuses on matching the organizational actions and goals to the environmental conditions.

In this

con- text, feedback must constantly emphasize the detection of
environmental signals that reflect organizational action. If such
signals are not generated or perceived, then the process ceases to be
a system. Therefore, feedback provides the network of monitoring
environmental change.
This task is extremely important for decision-making, however, it
is complicated by several factors.

First, there are the continual

communication problems (previously discussed) which formulate
ambiguities in goals and objectives. These make it difficult, if not
impossible to specify what signals can act as relevant feedback.
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There are also contradictions and ambiguities within the organization
itself as to which objectives are important and which are not; again,
making interpretation of feedback difficult. Second, the relationship
between environment and organization is dynamic and turbulent.

In

this unstable state, a natural barrier exists which may prohibit
responses between organization output and environmental impact. Emery
and Trist wrote extensively on this subject matter--the blockage of
feedback loops caused by environmental upheaval. 44 Then too, the
environment in which organizations interact is extremely complex and
large. This facilitates inadequate and confused technological and
conceptual schemes for evaluation.

Finally, there are time

constraints and resource limitations, along with other organizational
characteristics that permit no more than a "bounded" viewpoint or
reference to "rationality.145 Obviously, that was what Simon
contended in his theoretical argument.
Integrated Management Decision-Making attempts to alleviate many
of these information feedback barriers through restructuring.

Since

the focal point and main emphasis of IMDM is on integrated learning
between organization and environment, a forced restructuring of information monitoring components must occur. Many of the ambiguities and
confusions existing in organizations are due to a failure to openly
interact.

Distrust, anxieties, and status produce a fear of feedback;

since more information will be available to more sources about the
environmental consequences of one's activities.

IMDM stresses

learning; and if that can occur only through trial and error or
mistakes, then so be it. Restructuring of the organization to totally
respond to the environment through integrated means is essential.
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This is not a new concept, it is just an underdeveloped one. The
emergence of futuristic thinking stresses strategic planning, economic
forecasting and analysis, and creative modeling to grasp the
multi-dimensional levels of organization-environmental feedback. 46
Once again, Michael concurs with this concept:
Ideally, feedback should help reduce uncertainty by clarifying the
extent to which intended result is presently on track and the ways
in which it is not; and by clarifying and discriminating between
options by feeding back into the present, so to speak, carefully
worked out conjectures about the future ••• (this necessitates)
changing to structures that facilitate this process.
Here then, is the basis of Integrated Management Decision-Making;
to be innovative and imaginative in forethought based on an interactive
learning and feedback experience between organization and environment.
This process enables both entities to alter and adapt in original
design through trial and error or evaluation. Such a process is
flexible, and is characterized by fluidity and continuous evolvement
between stages.
Integrated Management Decision-Making and Police Patrol Allocation
The allocation of patrol personnel is one of the most important
decisions a police manager can make since between 70-95 percent of
most police budgets are for salaries, it is apparent that the major
cos~ for resources involves a department's manpower. 48 Therefore,
the obvious starting point for increasing productivity and managerial
decision-making must focus on the effective and efficient utilization
of police manpower.

Further, patrol deployment not only produces a

significant economic factor for police agencies, but also creates a
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number of other social, political, and community ramifications. For
instance, the way in which police are allocated has far reaching
racial tones in many cities as well as political gestures for ruling
elitists; or allocation design may drastically effect certain crime
patterns (i.e. prostitution, pornography, drug abuse) which in turn,
may bolster social reform and social change movements. Therefore, it
is essential that police manpower allocation be conducted through a
process which provides for futuristic thinking arid concurrent
organization-environmental learning.
Additionally, manpower allocation is characterized by a multiplicity of decisions.

It is not determined by a single judgment or

sole quantitative figure such as the increasing or decreasing of
police personnel. Rather, patrol allocation is derived through the
calculation of several independent decision-products. These are:
(1) The computation of an assignment availability factor,
(2) The determination of shift and manpower requirements,
(3) The design of sectors or beats, and;
(4) The selection of a patrol strategy.
These decisions must be integrated with one another as the
organization adapts to the environment with which it is changing.
Another important consideration concerning the focus of this
study, is found in the conditions surrounding deployment designs for
small urban cities. As elaborated in Chapter I, there appears to be
several factors (i.e. increased crime patterns, economic instability,
social and political uniqueness, and non-comprehensive, traditional
deployment plans) which exacerbate the failures of allocation
decision-making in this critical police area.

78

For these reasons, there is a need to improve decision-making in
the deployment of police personnel.

Integrated Management Decision-

Making provides the means by which advancement to effective and efficient manpower allocation can be achieved. This process incorporates
three specific features which overcome several of the deficiencies
previously described in other manpower deployment methods. These are:
1.

IMDM does not need the direct use of a computer and certainly
not the continual use of a computer assisted dispatch model.
This feature alone decreases cost and complexity.

2.

IMDM provides a way to continually update and modify patrol
deployment plans without costly additions or technological
applications. This is accomplished through quarterly
evaluations of specific variables utilized in the deployment
plan, and;

3.

IMDM address the local, decision-making elements of small
urban centers by incorporating direct imput from police
manager and other community officials. This feature provides
a means for assessing and evaluating various environmental
concerns such as political pressures, economic demands,
racial issues, cultural forces, etc. which have an important
impact on managerial police decision-making and manpower
deployment.
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CHAPTER III
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
In the previous chapters, the general nature of decision-making
as applied to police organization and management was discussed; and
those prior efforts to examine mathematical designs in patrol allocation was reviewed, noting both their contributions and shortcomings.
Additionally, in this chapter, a new technique entitled Integrated
Management Decision-making was introduced to provide a new and innovative model for decision-making. Here, specific parameters for the
application of this model (to police patrol allocation) are delineated
dealing with the research design, the nature of the data, the statement of research objectives, statistical analysis and hypothesis, and
the definition of specific terms.

Each of the above necessarily

places restrictions on the course of this study and, therefore, will
be addressed in some detail.
Research Design
This study was undertaken to examine and review the theoretical
issues concerning decision-making.

From this search, a new model was

formulated Integrated Management Decision-Making. This model was
applied to the task of police patrol allocation in small urban
centers. The City of Jonesboro, Arkansas, was used as a test case for
the demonstration of this process.
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Matilda White-Riley points out that the test-case study design is
highly effective when conducting exploratory research for model
building. l The procedure provides for an extremely detailed,
descriptive, qualitative and quantitative approach to the understanding of a social system or decision-making process.
Further, if we consider the inheritance of a test-case approach
from the social sciences, we find a methodology that enables the
researcher to explain more clearly what has happened in particular
circumstances, and to illuminate the social, cultural, and managerial
dynamics governing ways in which people respond to new events and new
procedures.
Although our horizons are strongly influenced by quantitative
studies and statistical analysis, there remains a conventional test
case approach to management decision-making and policy formation that
is derived from these social science methodologies. Pressman and
Wildavsky's insight on implementation in Oakland is a case in
point. 2 As Geis and Stotland noted recently, test-case studies and
demonstrative analysis can make a contribution to systematic scholarly
research on decision-making, and they have been pleased to find that
the tradition is enjoying a rebirth. 3 Further, this research design
is not only descriptive in nature, but can be used to systematically
measure the response of the environment, given an external stimulus.
Specifically, this approach is most suited to test new ideas and
innovations in organization-environmental behavior. 4
Data Source
To a large extent, there is a lack of adequate research with
respect to decision-making and police manpower allocation. This may
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be attributed to the inadequacy of available data sources.

Police

agencies, often fail to record and report statistics in a form amenable to social research.

Criminal activity data and number of calls

for services, for example, are often incomplete and not compiled in a
manner which easily links possible predictive variables to manpower
allocation.

It is not surprising that earlier investigations of man-

power allocation have centered attention solely on mathematical
designs not considering management objectives, goals or decisionmaking processes, since such data is often subjective and difficult to
assess.

Rarely, specific projects are undertaken which attempt to

weave the raw data and the subjective values together in an attempt to
formulate an ideal method.
The raw data base for the present study was derived from radiodispatch logs, detective entries, and official criminal incident
reports maintained by the Jonesboro Police Department.

Every radio

call dispatched to a uniform or detective unit in the Jonesboro Police
Department was explored for the time period of January 1, 1980 to
December 31, 1980. During this one year period, data were compiled on
over 8,300 police requests. A complete census of this time period was
taken based on three issues:
1. A census of a complete year compensates for seasonal
variances.
2. One year, is in actuality, a sample in itself. Acccording to
Shanahan, the use of the preceding year gives the most
accurate data base for manpower distribution needs. 5
3. The Jonesboro Police Department Records Division and Radio
Division are currently undergoing a radical change in main-
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tenance of criminal activity statistics, police reports, and
radio dispatching procedures. The collection of accurate and
complete data previous to 1980 would be impossible.
Thus, the challenge facing the Jonesboro Police Department, and
other agencies, is to obtain maximum efficiency and effectiveness in
deploying police manpower resources based, in part, on collected
historical data. There are inherent limitations to this data source.
First, not all requests for police services, especially those involving IIco1d felony-type crimes (i.e. week-old burglaries, aggravated
ll

assaults involving known offenders, and miscellaneous sex offenses)
are tabulated in police dispatch logs or officer reports.

Instead,

such cases are often handled strictly by Detective Division, bypassing direct police service. This practice has been somewhat confined by the implementation of a 1191111 emergency number, yet an
estimated ten percent of criminal activity is reported to police via
this method. 6
Additionally, statistical data derived from police reports are
often misconstrued as IIcrime rates. 1I Crimes known to the police bear
an unknown relationship to actual total criminal activity. Obviously,
many crimes are never reported to the police. 7 Wilson and Boland
argue that since police have little or no control over the willingness
of citizens to report crime, then the only measures viable for study
are those which at least display calculable sums for a reference in
patterns and trends. 8 For this reason, calls for services are suggested as measurable indicators for workload among police.
Aside from the raw data, subjective values and priorities are
placed on each variable tabulated from the 8,300 requests for police
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services (by the police manager).

In this manner, police allocation

is developed to accommodate the individuality of the community for
which it is designed.
Predictability and the Nature of the Data
While there are several approaches to the manpower distribution
problem, all have the common denominator of attempting to predict or
forecast needs for police services. Traditionally, and in this study,
a sample of past events has been recorded under the assumption that
history wiil repeat itself.

It has been assumed that previous calls

for service will continue to occur in the same frequency and in the
same geographical location.

It is important to note that there is an

irreducible limit to the precision which can be obtained from any predictive mechanism. To some extent, those things which are to be predicted are intrinsically uncertain.

No matter what kind or how much

data are collected, or how these data are processed, completely
accurate forecasts are unobtainable. 9 The practical problem is to
obtain as much accuracy as possible.
The problem of accuracy has several aspects.

In general, there

is no scientific theory which purports to explain the genises of calls
for police services. To some extent the process which generates these
events is under control of the police department. By adopting an
internal policy, the rate of calls can either be increased or
decreased within limits. At the same time much of the generation of
calls for services can be explained only by factors which are completely outside the control of the police department. Moreover, these
exogeneous factors are dynamic; they are in a continual process of
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change and must somehow be allowed for in the predictive mechanism.
Thus, a predictive procedure which attempts to explain or predict the
•

generation of calls for service in terms of a structural model involving a fundamental set of exogeneous, independent variables, must at
the same time predict the police department's own internal policies.
In the present state of knowledge it is unlikely that a sufficiently
flexible predictive model can be constructed on this basis.
The principal alternative to a structural model is some type of
reduced form which predicts future events in terms of the past history
of events, as produced in this dissertation.
Definition of Terms
The most frequently used terms are defined in the context in
which they are used in this study.
Police Unit. A police patrol call occupied by either one or two
officers assigned to a specific geographical area.
Police Call. A request for police service that was transmitted
from the radio dispatcher to the police unit.
Back-up or Cover Unit. A second police unit dispatched to a
location.
Sector. A specific geographic area assigned to a patrol unit; a
beat.
Shift. An arrangement of working hours which allows x-number of
police units be available on a twenty-four hour basis; duty period.
Response Time. The period of time calculated from dispatch time
to arrival time.
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Call Time. The period of time calculated from arrival time to
clear time.
Elapsed Time. The period of time calculated from dispatch time
to clear time.
Police Patrol Techniques.

A variety of police patrol programs

aimed at controlling the level of occurrence of specific crimes in
Examples of these techniques are Crime

designated geographical areas.

Specific Analysis, Directed Patrol, Two-man Patrol, and Team
Policing. 10
Operationalization of Variables
The following variables are selected to be included in the
present study.
Time. The variable of time was measured in six different modes.
Each police call was tabulated by:

(1) month of the year, (2) day of

the month, (3) day of the week, (4) dispatch time of the police call
to the police unit, (5) arrival time of the police unit to the dispatched location, and (6) clear time or time which the police unit
left a dispatched police call and was available for additional duties.
Weight Factor of Call. This is a subjective assignment, of
ordinal nature, based on the urgency of the police call. The weight
coincides with the response procedure conducted by the dispatched
police unit. Weight factor 3 is a "code 3" call representing a
criminal act in progress or an emergency displaying imminent peril to
human life (i.e. a robbery in progress, an officer needs immediate
help, or a shooting); weight factor 2 is a "code 2" call representing
a need for assistance rapidly,

however~

no imminent peril to human
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life exists (i.e. a family fight, a neighborhood disturbance, a
burglary alarm); weight factor 1 is a "code 111 call representing a
need for assistance without urgency (i.e. a "cold" burglary, an escort
request, a barking dog). Traffic accidents were weighted based on the
in-depth analysis of police reports which reflected an emergency condition, the nature of injuries sustained, if any, and/or the existence
of an imminent threat to human life. ll
Allocation of a Second Police Unit. A simple two digit code
classified the presence or absence of a dispatched back-up or cover
unit.
Seriousness of Arrest. The variable of seriousness of arrest was
separated into four ordinal classifications:

(1) no arrest made stem-

ming from the police call, (2) a traffic citation or police summons
was issued, (3) a misdemeanor arrest was made stemming from the police
call, or (4) a felony arrest was produced from the police call. All
charges or arrests were classified by the Arkansas State Criminal Code
as to felony or misdemeanor in nature.
Type of Incident. Each dispatched police call was nominally
classified into the following types of incidents:
1. Murder - Homicide
2. Aggravated Assault
3.

Forcible Rape

4. Robbery
5.

Burglary

6. Theft over $100.00
7. Auto - Motor Vehicle Theft

B. All other criminal offenses of a felony nature
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9. All other ciminal offenses of a misdemeanor nature
10. Traffic accident
11. Calls for service (miscellaneous)
12. Neighborhood problem/disturbance
13. Family fight/problem
14. Assist outside agency
15. Alarms
Subjective Prioritization. This critical element to the
decision-making method was a simple ordinal ranking of raw data
variables into most desirable to least desirable for allocation
design. This prioritization of variables was a direct input from the
police manager.
Geographical Location of an Incident. A map of the surrounding
Jonesboro, Arkansas, area (approximately 150 square miles) was divided
into 260 square geographical blocks, each block representing a .5
square mile location within the metropolitan center.

Each block was

alphabetically and numerically coded. Whenever a police call was
tabulated, the specific geographical block code was used to designate
location. There were 57 such blocks within the city boundaries.
Multiple Reponse Index (MRI). A calculated value for each of the
above described geographical locations based on the subjective prioritization of variables by the police manager. Multiple response
indices are determined through the SPSS program, Multiple Response
Analysis.

For this study, the multiple response index for a given

geographical location is calculated by prioritizing the variables of
(l) incident type, (2) weight factor, (3) seriousness of arrest, and
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(4) allocation of second police unit. The summation of this prioritization for each police call tabulated within a specific geographical
location equals the multiple response index.
Equalization of Workload.

A calculation which represents the

same proportional amount of work per officer independent of day, duty
period, or geographical region. This variable is measured by calculating a value (the multiple response index) for a specific geographiThe measurement of this variable assumes that each
officer is equally capable of serving a call. 12

cal region.

Calls for Service. The number of police calls tabulated within a
specific period of time.
Statistical Analysis
Measures of association and tests of significance are utilized to
examine the relationship between variables in order to design an ideal
decision-making method for police patrol allocation. Much of the
earlier research on the topic of optimum patrol design (discussed in
the previous chapter) has employed either one or the other of these
techniques, but few have simultaneously used both. Measures of association are used to designate the strength of relationship between
variables, while tests of significance give indication of the
probability of whether relations observed are due to chance variation. 13
In this study, there are two analytic procedures to be utilized,
Multiple Response Analysis and the Kruskal-Wallis Analysis of Variance
by Ranks.
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Multiple Response Analysis (MRA). This particular statistic has
been incorporated into the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences
(SPSS), an integrated system of computer programs designed for the
analysis of social science data. 14 The system was developed at the
National Opinion Research Center at the University of Chicago in
1970. Multiple Response Analysis is a non-parametric technique displaying the strength of a relationship between variables.
It is a statistical procedure which preserves the order of the
responses or variables (input) and permits analysis of the "most
important" variable as though it were a normal variable. This technique holds constant the prioritized ordering of input data. The
design specifically permits analysis of simple variables, multiple
dichotomies, and multiple response items both individually and in conjunction with one another. The procedure provides two types of
output--frequency tables and n-way crosstabulations.1 5
The statistics provided by MRA which are used in this study are
the following:
1. Chi-Square: Chi-square is a test of statistical significance
which determines whether a systematic relationship exists
between variables. This is done by computing the cell frequencies (of a table) which would be expected if no relationship is present between the variable given the existing row
and column totals. The expected cell frequencies are then
compared to the actual values found within the table. 16
2. Contingency Coefficient: The contingency coefficient C is a
measure of association based upon chi-square.
compare tables having 'the same dimensions. 17

It is used to
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3.

Multiple Reponse Index {MRI}: This is the most important
computation from the Multiple Response Analysis technique.

A

.

separate value is calculated for each data entry based upon
an additive and weighting process. 18 The MRI ;s a value to
be utilized in other statistical techniques {for this study,
the Kruskal-Wallis Test is employed}, to examine the
relationship between subjective variable input (from the
police manager) and equalization of workload.
Multiple Response Analysis is selected for the present study
since it meets all the basic analysis needs for this dissertation.

It

utilizes measures of association between variables in nominal scale.
The Kruskal-Wallis Test. The Kruskal-Wallis Analysis of Variance
by Ranks is an extremely useful test for deciding whether
k~i~dependent

d~fferences

samples are from different populations or have extreme

in mean parameters. Sample values almost invariably

differ somewhat, and the question is whether the differences among the
samples signify genuine population differences or whether they
represent random chance variables such as are to be expected. The
Kruskal-Wallis technique tests the null hypothesis that the k-samples
come from the same population or from identical populations with
respect to averages. The Kruskal-Willis Test can be used for comparative purposes.1 9
The test assumes that the variable under study has an underlying
continuous distribution.
variable. 20

It requires ordinal measurements of that

Compared with the most powerful parametric statistic, the F-test,
the Kruskal-Wallis Test has a power efficiency of 95.5 percent. 2l
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The test involves a comparison of the sums of the rankings for
each of the categories of the nominal-scale variable.

In this study,

original manpower design is nominally divided into sectors, the summation of rankings of Multiple Response Indices is then compared to
the proposed manpower design.

A statistic H is computed in order to

measure the degree to which the various sums of ranks differ from what
would be expected under the null hypothesis. The sampling distribution of H is approximately chi-square. 22
The Kruskal-Wallis Test is selected for the present study since
it meets all the basic analysis needs for this dissertation.

It was

chosen rather than the equivalent parametric test in order to avoid
making the assumptions concerning normality and homogeniety of
variance associated with the parametric F-test, and to increase the
generality of findings. 23
Statement of Hypothesis for the Kruskal-Wallis Test
It is assumed that the medians of the multiple response index
populations are equal.
Limitations
Several important limitations of this study must be mentioned.
Since each of these may have implications for the results, they should
be given attention as limiting factors.
First, the data for this study are limited by time and space.
The population is limited to calls for service for the Jonesboro,
Arkansas Police Department. Only police calls which were actually
dispatched to police units were given consideration. Further, the
data are derived from incidents occurring only in the year 1980.
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Missing or incomplete sampling is an unavoidable limitation of
this study. Data were compiled from police records which do not have
exacting controls or accuracy checks.

It is probable that certain

insignificant calls (such as barking dogs, misparked cars, etc.) were
not represented on the radio-dispatched log for each occasion. Then
too, the sample size of over 8,300 pieces presented human observation
and tabulation procedures which may have resulted in error. These
measurement errors weaken statistical relationships which means that
they may truly exist even though they are shown to be statistically
insignificant. 24
In the techniques of analysis selected, the chief limitation is
that the Kruskal-Wallis Test is insensitive to population normality
and homogeneity of variance. The data presented in this study is
nominal and ordinal and, therefore, discrete.

However, the Kruskal-

Wallis Test is the most appropriate and efficient test given the data
assumptions.

It converts scores to ranks, thereby preserving

magnitude of the scores and utilizing more of the information in data
observations than any other non-parametric statistic. 25
Finally, this study is restricted to a unique case--Jonesboro,
Arkansas. Also, the study is restricted to the variables in the data
base.

Even though the major objective of this dissertation is to

design a method for decision-making in which different variables from
other city departments may be utilized, it must be emphasized that the
results of this study would probably be different if the information
was taken from other points in time and location.
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CHAPTER IV
APPLICATION OF INTEGRATED MANAGEMENT DECISION-MAKING MODEL
TO POLICE PATROL DEPLOYMENT METHOD
In this chapter, a transition is presented from the theoretical
model to the practical method of police patrol deployment. Similar
components are discussed in relation to this transition. Further, a
description of the Jonesboro, Arkansas Police Department, as well as
the city itself, is provided for reference information.
The final part of this chapter focuses on the decision-products
derived from the application of this model to patrol deployment in
Jonesboro. As mentioned earlier, these decision-products include the
determination of :(1) assignment-availability factor; (2) shift
requirement; (3) sector design; and (4) patrol strategy.
Transition From Model to Method
In Chapter III, the theoretical framework for Integrated Management Decision-making was presented. Here, refinement of the model
produces a method which can be employed in the allocation of police
patrol in small urban centers. Each "stage" of the theoretical model
can be correspondingly deduced to a step within the deployment
method. Therefore, this transition assimilates conceptual components
to working parts in order to accomplish a desired result.
Criteria. The initial step in any problem-solving model (whether
it be conceptual or practical) is to define and set objectives. The

102

criteria step in the deployment plan is congruent with the lIarticulation of objective ll stage in the theoretical abstraction, with
additional elaboration.
The objective for manpower deployment is allocation based on
equalized workload. However, there are interpretive problems as to
what exactly is lIequalized work10ad. 1I As described in Chapter I,
equalized workload studies have produced a variety of programs based
on observations and activity reports that classify lIequalized workload ll in terms of hazard-formula, police time, total activity, preventative patrol, type of call, etc. l

It should be clearly noted, that

the purpose of equalizing workload is not necessarily to reduce crime,
but to increase the productive use of existing resources. Thus, the
unique feature built-in to the criteria step of this method involves
the selection and prioritization of variables on which the objective
is structured. The police manager or police chief selects a set of
variables which act as IIstepsll to the accomplishment of the
objective.

In every city there are a number of external or internal

variables which effect patrol deployment. Some of these may be the
type of police call, the elapsed time of each call, the number of
serious shootings per district, the number of drunk driver caused
accidents in a given time period, the type of arrests made in a
specific location, response time, number of assaulted officers in each
district, number of reported crimes per location, etc. The list can
go on forever; and is limited only by the user's imagination and the
ability to collect relevant data pertaining to each variable. For
example, a police chief could not select the variable of number of
elderly white rape victims per district if he had no historical record
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nor manner in which to collect the age or race of victims. The
variable has to be tabulated, or at least, able to be documented for
use in the allocation-deployment method.
Further, the criteria stage is designed to accommodate up to five
selected variables. Each variable is prioritized as to most important
to least important in the design of patrol sectors and the feasibility
of patrol strategies.

Each variable receives this prioritization by

use of the multiple response index. A simple weighting scale is
designed so that the number one prioritized variable receives the
highest value and the least important variable receives the lowest
value.
As demonstrated for use in this study, the police chief in
Jonesboro, Arkansas selected the following variables, listed in order
of importance (highest-first):

= weight of 4
Priority of call per district = weight of 3
Type of arrest made at each call = weight of 2
Need for assistance or cover at each call = weight of 1
Type of call per district

The chief wished to select only four variables, however, he could
have chosen one more, or conversely deleted two.

In any case, the

variables chosen were documented on dispatch logs and activity sheets
rendering an historical pattern for the past year. The selection and
prioritization of variables is an extremely important element in the
method as all further analysis and processes assume the "criteria" as
a fundamental guideline on which to base the achievement of the stated
objective.
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This step provides two innovative procedures in the design of a
deployment plan.

First, the "criteria" or variables on which the

.

objective is structured can be altered to fit the management desires
of any department. By simply "plugging-inn those variables by which
the user wishes deployment to be predicted, the method takes on a
flexible and adaptive quality unique to each community environment or
departmental characteristic.

For the first time in allocation design,

the input for deployment is strategically placed with the police
manager.

All too often, the consultant or researcher entertains the

illusion that he is the expert in the community under study, as
Maruyama so accurately stresses. 2 This design method emphasizes the
utility of management input. Further, the selection of criteria is
not limited to that of the police chief.

It is highly advisable that

user input be broadened to include attitudes of non-police, city
administrators.

Since funding and expenditure are often times

political entities, it should be natural for input to include those
ideas from controlling bodies such as mayors, councilmen, aldermen,
and other community leaders.

Involving the power structure of any

community into critical decision-making (such as "how" police manpower
I

is distributed) maintains an optimum communication-feedback between
the city government and the police organization as well as identifies
any political or opposing phenomena.
Secondly, this patrol plan incorporates the use of several
different variables in the allocation of manpower.
a singular or structured variable.

It is not based on

It has the unique capability of

changing with different departments, environments, and times as the
future evolves. This enables any department to maintain a dynamic
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feature in patrol deployment amid a turbulent and rapidly changing
environment, so characteristically documented in today's world. 3
Allocation. This step is similar to the "implementation" stage.
It requires doing something with data and information.

In this step

the design of allocation is applied to the environment or; the
decision-products regarding equalization by prioritized criteria are
computed. The allocation of manpower is based on the equalization of
workload represented in multiple response indices predicated by the
selected criteria. Certain values such as assignment-availability
factors, workload by month and day, workload by hour, response time,
and frequency of police calls by month, day and hour are determined to
establish shift requirements and sector design. Allocation can be
viewed as a response of the police organization to environmental
pressures existing in the "criteria" stage.
In this study, the Kruskal-Wallis Analysis of Variance Test is
utilized to compare workload in the original sector design (currently
used in Jonesboro) to the proposed sector design (which results from a
physical manipulation of district/beat boundaries attempting to
equalize workload). The calculated H value, approximately chi-square
and having a power efficiency of 95.5 percent of that of the F test,
indicates differences between sector workload within the two designs.
The Kruskal-Wallis procedure will be further discussed later in this
chapter.
Strategies.

In this section, an assessment of patrol strategies

and techniques is discussed in order to select a particular form of
patrol. Herman Goldstein has raised an interesting pOint in his book,
Policing a Free Society.4 Once sectors have been designed and a
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number of men have been deployed to areas of police protection, the
level of patrol is of less importance than the form of patrol
activities. Stated much more simply, the Kansas City experiment
showed no significant differences in the incidence of crime resulting
from variations in the number of officers assigned, or level of
patrol.

However, the form of patrol has proven to make a significant

difference when considering the evaluations of Team Policing, Directed
Patrol, Split-Force Patrol, Tactical Patrol, etc. 5
The "strategies" component allows the police manager to assess
different patrol forms singularly or in combination with the
"allocation" of sector designs presented in the earlier step. The
ideal situation, facilitated by the method, is to match sector and
shift design with a patrol strategy that renders an optimum manpower
distribution through total participation of the police organization.
Obviously, the strategies component in this practical method can be
equated to the "organization-environmental learning" stage in the
conceptual model. Both parts involve an attempt to integrate the
organization with the environment.

In practical application, this

interprets into learning how to assimilate allocation design and
patrol strategy. The environment is altered during the "implementation" stage or allocation component, hence the organization learns to
improve deployment further by complementing this change with an
amenable patrol strategy. Such a process is seen as an organizational
action intended to meld objectives with surrounding influences.
Decision. This step is similar to the "adaptation" stage.

It

represents the final response of the organization to effectively cope
with change started earlier in the implementation process. Here,
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final manpower adjustments are integrated with the strategies component to result in a design of optimum effectiveness through
equalized workload and total participation.

For the police organiza-

tion, this step may call for an increase or decrease in overall
personnel, resources, and equipment, depending on the degree of change
necessary to adapt to new contingencies and situtations.

Ideally, as

in the conceptual model, this step is totally integrated with the
learning process so that maximum foresight and flexibility can be
attained in matching environmental pressures.
Evaluation. Following the principle that a model for decisionmaking applied to the deployment of police personnel must not be done
once and then forgotten, the evaluation step acts as a monitoring
device to remind organizations of current change. This necessitates
the periodic examination of environmental features and criminalincident patterns.
The patrol force distribution should be evaluated quarterly or
once every three months. Similar to the "feedbackll stage, evaluation
permits the continual updating of informatioh on which deployment is
based.

For the most part, changes will be subtle for small to

medium-size police departments; however, through a careful analysis,
the police administrator will be able to observe them and then
anticipate the police service that will be required in the future, for
truly, "what is past is prologue. 1I6
Additionally, evaluation consists of analyzing what the current
organizational objectives are in relation to environmental influences
and demands.

Evaluation, therefore, consists of deciphering those

signals that suggest changes in the organization. For example, police
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departments have traditionally failed to incorporate political and
economic conditions in planning for manpower deployment.

However, as

exhibited in many cities today, there exists a relationship between
crime patterns and employment rates or between service demands and
poverty levels. 7 Evaluation and information feedback assists the
police organization in refining these relationships as well as
identifying those areas of potential concern.
Figure 2 displays a schematic of the patrol deployment method as
derived from the theoretical model--Integrated Management Decisionmaking.

The following discussion sets forth those decision-products

obtained by the application of this model to the Jonesboro, Arkansas
Police Department.
The Test Case: Jonesboro, Arkansas
The City.

The City of Jonesboro, in northeastern Arkansas, with

a population of 32,000, is the center of an urban community of over
65,000 people. An agriculturally-based trade city, it is the
headquarters of Riceland Incorporated, and boasts the largest rice
mill in the world as well as other substantial grain processing
facilities.

It supports several large industrial complexes such as

DuPont manufacturing, General Electric engineering, and Krueger
publishing. While Jonesboro has attempted to maintain a diverse
economic base, agriculture and farming still remains the singular,
most important labor market. Subsequently, with the rise in interest
rates and a poor national economy, coupled with a severe 1979-1980
drought, Jonesboro (along with the rest of Arkansas) is undergoing a
period of economic decline.

POLICE PATROL DEPLOYMENT AS DEMONSTRATED IN
JONESBORO, ARKANSAS
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In many ways, the city is atypical of the South. Over 90 percent
of the city's population is white and only 7 percent of the population
is b1ack. 8 The vast majority of the population is native-born to'
the Ozark regions of lower Missouri and Arkansas, and settled in
Jonesboro where centralized trade and farming offered employment
opportunities.

In 1979, the Bureau of Census ranked Arkansas 49th out

of the 50 states having the lowest average earned income, head of
household at $6,785.00. 9
The government of Jonesboro is similar to other cities having a
city council and mayor, with exception to the prolific number of
councilmen. There are 12 aldermen who sit as heads of various committees and departments within the administration and a mayor with
over 15 years experience as chief executive.
The crime rate in Jonesboro is well below the national average
and the average for all cities of population 25,000 to 49,999. Refer
to Table 1.
TABLE I
RATE OF INDEX OFFENSES KNOWN TO POLICE, 1979
PER 100,000 POPULATION
National Average
Non-Metro Cities

Arkansas

Jonesboro*

Total

4364

3621

1748

Violent

285

366

66

Property

4079

3255

1682

*Based on Jonesboro, Arkansas residential populations of 25,000.
Calculated from Jonesboro Police Department Records and FBI Uniform
Crime Reports, 1979.
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Residents of the city proclaim that such a low crime phenomena is
the result of religious rebirth. Situated in the "Heart of the Bible
Belt," Jonesboro supports over 100 separate churches, the main denomination being of Southern Baptist extraction. The religious tempo of
the city is credited for denying the dispensing or selling of
alcoholic beverages in the county. Jonesboro is a "dry" city.
However, other reasons drastically effect the low reported crime
rate in Jonesboro which are not highly publicized. First, there are
two means by which crime activity is documented. One of these methods
is the simple tabulation of "incidents reported to po1ice.
is a classification of "crimes under investigation."

1I

The other

It appears that

the Jonesboro Police Department reports (to the FBI) only those crimes
falling within the second category. Criminal incidents which do not
have obvious follow-up leads or investigative directions and which are
of a minor consequence, (such as bicycle thefts, simple vandal isms,
and minor fights) are simply forgotten and rarely addressed.
Secondly, while conducting research at the Jonesboro Police Department, the author became aware of several criminal incidents which were
brought to the attention of the police, however, never formally
reported.

The major reason for this second failure is tied to the

problems produced by the first.

Jonesboro police officers are very

cognizant of the department's procedure regarding follow-up investigations. Knowing that little, if any, investigation would ever result
from the incident report; officers simply do not take the report for
reasons of expediency. As one officer stated, "Why take the report •
• • nothing is going to come of it anyway."
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The Police Department. The Jonesboro Police Department is an
urban law enforcement agency consisting of 44 sworn personnel, having
jurisdiction over a 40 square mile area. 10 It is headquartered i~
the Justice Complex which serves as, housing for the district and
circuit court as well as the police department. Security is very
~

relaxed, with an attitude of "being friendly" more important than
taking necessary safeguards. For this reason, the radio-dispatcher
often acts as receptionist simultaneously, and police cars as well as
front doors are rarely locked.
The department is headed by a retired FBI agent native to the
area. Refer to Figure 3 for an organizational chart of the department. There is no civil service or police union and hiring and
promotion is a discretionary move by the Chief. Jonesboro patrol
officers are severely underpaid at $11,860.00 per year as compared to
other similar department officers. ll Further, the Chief has consistently requested additional manpower and equipment increases with
little avail.

All in all, these factors have led to poor morale among

officers and a cynical attitude regarding change.
However, after just one year of apPointment, the Chief has made
continual progress in improving supervisor-officer relations, management techniques, records and data collection, investigative
procedures, and patrol deployment.
Decision-Products
This presentation shows the relationship between the current
manpower deployment design utilized in Jonesboro and the proposed
design based upon the calculations of equalized workload and multiple

Chief

~

Secretary (sworn officer)

Captain

Assistant Chief - - - -

Captain

Captain

Records/Radio
Division

Uniform Patrol

Service Division

Criminal Investigation Division

28 sworn officers

4 civilians

7 sworn officers

I

I
3 sworn officers
I
2 civilians

Total:

I

I

I

I

I

,

1 civilian

44 sworn personnel
3 civilians

Figure 3: Organizational structure
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response indices. Disparaties between the two designs are emphasized
by statistical procedure, specifically the Kruskal-Wa11is Test in
sector pattern and percentile variance in shift scheme.
Assignment-Availability Factor. 12 For every day of the year,
twenty-four hours a day, there exists a manpower need for police
agencies. The potential need in a patrol force is eight hours a day,
three times a day.
hours a day.

Each patrol officer is required to work eight

Each patrol officer is required to work eight hours a

day for five consecutive days in the Jonesboro Police Department •
. This is a common assignment period per officer found throughout police
agencies. Further, each officer is assigned a beat, and the beat is
manned for each tour of duty.

However, in reality, no officer will

man his sector each day of the year because of several factors.
Before any deployment plan can be designed, a need arises to know
the actual assignment-availability factor to man one sector once every
eight hours for 365 days. To determine the number of officers
necessary to man each beat at all times, it is necessary to find out
in hours what is potentially available and what is actually available
due to loss of officer time because of extenuating circumstances.
These circumstances or factors are generally universal to all
police agencies, including the Jonesboro Police Department. They are
regular days off, vacations, sick time, training, holidays, military
leave, court time, special details, officer suspension, and any other
loss of time that may have a significant effect on availability of
personnel. To calculate the potential need for available hours for
one officer, the following formula is applied:
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Number of days/year X Number of hours in a shift
365 X 8

= 2,920

potential hours available
per officer per year

From the computation of 2,920 potential available hours per
officer per year, it is possible to calculate an assignmentavailability factor needed to man one sector for eight hours each day,
365 days a year. Using the Jonesboro Police Department individual
circumstances and averages, a factor of 1.85 is computed.

In simple

terms this factor means that it requires the Jonesboro police agency
to have 1.85 officers available to man one sector for eight hours for
365 days or 5.55 officers to man one sector for twenty-four hours a
day for 365 days. Refer to Table II for an outlay of relevant data
and computed assignment-availability factors.
Thus, the typical Jonesboro police officer works five days a
week, and eight hours a day, assigned to one sector. There are
currently four sectors in Jonesboro to be manned per shift. This
computes into a need of 22.2 men available each day for patrol.
Referring to Table III, it is observed that this need is statistically
met.
However, the original number of total men available for patrol is
erroneous. Lieutenants are rarely assigned patrol sectors on a shift;
their duty period is filled with supervisory, administrative and
managerial tasks.

Further, a Selective Traffic Enforcement Program

utilizes two officers per shift or a total of six men. Table IV
reveals that a maximum of 19 officers are available currently to man
four sectors per shift twenty-four hours a day, 365 days a year. This
is three men short of the calculated available-assignment factor for
the Jonesboro Police Department. Refer to Table IV.
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TABLE II
DATA AND COMPUTATION FOR ASSIGNMENT - AVAILABILITY FACTOR
JONESBORO POLICE DEPARTMENT*
2,920

POTENTIAL HOURS AVAILABLE
Circumstances under Consideration:
Vacation Time (15 days X 8 hours)

120

Regular Days Off (102 days X 8)

816

Sick Time (20 days X 8)

160

Training or Inservice (4 days X 8)

32

Ho1 idays (12 days X 8)

96

Court Time (8 days X 8)

64

Mi 1itary Leave (7 days X 8)

56

Suspensions, Discipline

?

Line of Duty Injury

?

TOTAL:
Remainder = 2,920 - 1,344 = 1,576
.
. Factor = 2,920
Asslgnment
- Aval. 1ab·1 1lty
1,576
*Based on 1980 averages and figures.

1,344

1 85
=.
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TABLE III

ASSIGNMENT - AVAILABILITY FACTORS
28 OFFICER PATROL FORCE
JONESBORO POLICE DEPARTMENT
POTENTIAL MAN - DAYS AVAILABLE (365 days X 28)
Vacation (15 days X 28)

10,220
420

Regular Days Off (102 days X 28)

2,856

Sick Time (20 days X 28)

560

Training (4 days X 28)

112

Holidays (12 days X 28)

336

Court Time (8 days X 28)

224

Military Leave (7 days X 28)

196

Suspensions, Discipline

?

Line of Duty Injury

?

TOTAL:

4,704

Remainder - 10,220 - 4,704 = 5,516
.
Ass~gnment
- Ava~·1a b·1·
~ ~ty Factor = 10,220
5,516 -- 1 . 85

0 ff·~cers

Assignment - Availability Factor for 3 shifts = 5.5 officers
Assignment - Availability Factor for 4 shifts =22.2 officers
Current Patrol Manpower

=28.0 officers
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TABLE IV
CORRECTED ASSIGNMENT - AVAILABILITY FACTORS
JONESBORO POLICE DEPART}ffiNT
Current Patrol

28 officers

~~npower

Lieutenants

3

Selective Traffic Enforcement

6

Actual or Real Patrol Force
Corrected Assignment - Availability Factor
Need (Manpower Increase)

19 officers
22.2 officers
3 officers

Calculated Assignment - Availability Factor
with proposed five man increase
(includes Lieutenants and Selective Traffic Enforcement)
32.4 officers
Jonesboro Patrol Manpower
(with proposed five man increase)

33 officers
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Thus, to maintain the current sector design, a manpower increase
of three men is mandatory.

For purposes of this dissertation, it is

assumed that all manpower requests will be granted.

Deliberation is

currently on-going in the Jonesboro City government for a manpower
increase of five officers (it is expected to be fulfilled). Therefore, the corrected total number of available men for patrol is 33
officers; which realistically and statistically meets a corrected
available-assignment factor of 32.4 officers within the Jonesboro
Police Department. Refer to Table IV.
Shift Determination and Manpower Distribution. The Jonesboro
police officer works a traditional five days a week, and eight hours
each day. This is forty working hours per week per man. There are 33
officers of all ranks in the department (3 lieutenants, 6 sergeants,
and 24 officers) available for patrol services. 13 Allowing one
lieutenant per shift, this would mean 30 officers times 40 hours, or
1,200 man-hours of patrol force service per week.
This section addresses the distribution of these 1,200 man-hours
of patrol service over the 168 hours of the seven-day week. The goal
is to provide an optimum arrangement of working hours by shift that
would cause equalization of workload within shifts. Several variables
will be studied regarding shift variance. These are the number of
calls by month, the number of type of calls by day, the multiple
response indices by day, shift differences in response time, number of
calls by time and multiple response indices by time. An average
hourly workload will be calculated based on multiple response indices
and a within-shift variance will be computed for each set of shift
time.
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1. Number of Calls by Month.

This frequency count is important

as it shows variation between seasons. Obviously, some variation is
expected. However, if extreme differences occur between months then
an indication of altered manpower needs is required. Table V displays
the number of calls by month.
On observing Table V, it can be concluded that little variance is
present between months. The standard deviation is low as well as the
variance.
It is noteworthy to observe that the summer months of June, July,
August, and September reflected the most demand of police services.
This is indicative of national trends displayed in the FBI Uniform
Crime Reports for the last several years. 14
2.

Number of Calls by Day. This frequency count displays number

of calls by day of week.

It graphically displays which days require

the most police service. Refer to Table VI.
Friday and Saturday, again coinciding with national patterns,
display the highest need for police manpower. 15 For the purposes of
manpower distribution, it is important to split week-ends off.

In

other words, no one man receives both Friday and Saturday as regular
days off. This will ease personnel desires as part of the week-end is
"free" and allow a more equitable method of achieving maximum police
service on those respective days.

Changing days off is always a

touchy subject among police officers.

Everyone would like to have

Friday and Saturday evening off, however, peak service is required on
those days. To accommodate both equity among officer's days off and
police service need, seniority should govern this issue.
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TABLE V
NUMBER OF ~~LS BY MONTH, 1980
JONESBORO POLICE DEPARTMENT
Frequency

Relative Percentage

January

687

8.2

February

583

7.0

March

669

8.0

April

629

7.5

May

705

8.6

June

766

9.2

July

800

9.6

August

810

9.7

September

708

8.5

October

705

8.4

November

614

7.4

December

650

7.9

8,326

100.0

Totals:
Standard Deviation:

68.23
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TABLE VI
NUMBER OF CALLS BY DAY - 1980
JONESBORO POLICE DEPARTMENT
Freguencl

Relative Percentage

Monday

1,192

14.3

Tuesday

1,193

1403

Wednesday

1,047

12.6

Thursday

1,133

13.6

Friday

1,371

16.2

Saturday

1,308

15.7

Sunday

1,082

13.0

8,326

100.0

Tota 1:

Standard Deviation: 116.95
To check the tabulations of calls by day, a second frequency was
computed. The difference being a plot of multiple response indices
(instead of calls for service) against day of week.

Figure 4 is a

graphical display reinforcing the need for maximum police service on
Friday and Saturday.
3. Shift Assignment. The next step is to determine the optimum
arrangement of working hours by shift based again, on multiple
response indices set by the police manager. The shift hours selected
should be those that have least variation in workload between hourly
peaks and valleys regarding activity. This method will allow for the
assignment of officers by shift, thus reducing the possibility of
having too many or too few officers on duty at any given time. 16
Table VII reflects the frequency of number of calls by hour by
current shift. An extremely low chi-square and high variance supports

Multiple Response
Index
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88.1
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Graphical display - multiple response indices by day of week.
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TABLE VII

NUMBER OF CALLS BY HOUR BY CURRENT SHIFT, 1980
JONESBORO POLICE DEPARTMENT
Frequency
Morning Shift:
7:00 a.m.
8:00 a.m.
9:00 a.m.
10:00 a.m.
11:00 a.m.
12:00 noon
1:00 p.m.
2:00 p.m.

Relative
Percentage

227
324
299
309
322
322
419
408

3.9
5.0
4.9

2630

31%

376
438
431
427
441
478
538
529

4.5
5.3
5.2
5.1
5.3
5.7
6.5
6.4

3656

44%

547
415
339
242
163
124
110
100

6.6
5.0
4.1
2.9
2.0

Subtotals:

2040

25%

TOTALS:

8326

100%

- 7:59
- 8:59
- 9:59
- 10:59
11:59
- 12:59
- 1:59
- 2:59

a.m.
a.m.
a.m.
a.m.
a.m.
p.m.
p.m.
p.m.

Subtotals:
Afternoon Shift:

3: 59
4:59
5:59
6:59
7:59
8:59
9: 59
- 10:59

3:00 p.m. -

4:00
5:00
6:00
7:00
8:00
9:00
10:00

p.m.
p.m.
p.m.
p.m.
p.m.
p.m.
p.m.

p.m.
p.m.
p.m.
p.m.
p.m.
p.m.
p. m.
p.m.

Subtotals:
Night Shift:
11:00 p.m.
12:00 mid.
1:00 a.m.
2:00 a.m.
3:00 a.m.
4:00 a.m.
5:00 a.m.
6:00 a.m.

- 11:59 p.m.
- 12:59 a.m.
- 1:59 a.m.
- 2:59 a.m.
- 3:59 a.m.
- 4:59 a.m.
- 5:59 a.m.
- 6:59 a.m.

Standard Deviation:
Chi-Square:
Significance:

132.45

2.6 at 21 degrees of freedom
.01

2.7
3.9
3.6
3.7
,.. n
,;).":1

1.5
1.3
1.2
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the conclusion that a systematic relationship does not exist between
shifts, hence the variables of shift hours and calls for service are
independent.

Further, observation reveals that 44 percent of the

calls occur on the afternoon shift and that the hours of 9:00 p.m. to
12:00 midnight are the peak time of police demands. This follows a
national pattern. 17
Comparing different shift assignments by calls for service, it is
observed that the existing shift times are not the most equitable in
terms of workload. See Table VIII. While the 6:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m.
shift rotation appears to have a more equalized percentage, it is
important to realize that this data only reflects a single variable
frequency.

A much better shift scheme can be realized by plotting a

multiple variable conglomerate against each shift rotation.

If the

multiple response indices are tabulated for hourly workload, segmented
into shift rotations and computed for least within-shift variation; a
more accurate diagram of equalized workload will appear. Figure 5
displays such a computation.
Donald T. Shanahan indicated that if optimum change-of-shift time
should be on such non-traditional hours, such as exhibited in this
data and in Figure 5, the difference in variance may be so minor that
what might be gained in efficiency would be lost in personnel morale
and organizational conf1ict. 18 It should be strongly noted that the
4:00 a.m. to 12:00 noon shift rotation reveals the least percent of
within-shift variance, however, the difference from that of the
current 7:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. rotation is only three points. Under
these circumstances, the data would suggest that current shift hours
be maintained, and that alternative strategies be employed to allow
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TABLE VIII

SHIFT ASSIGNMENT BY CALLS FOR SERVICE, 1980
JONESBORO POLICE DEPARTMENT
Frequency

Relative Percentage

5 a.m. - 1 p.m.

2013

24

1 p.m. - 9 p.m.

3418

41

9 p.m. - 5 a.m.

2895

35

6 a.m. - 2 p.m.

2322

28

2 p.m. - 10 p.m.

3537

42

10 p.m. - 2 a.m.

2569

30

7 a.m. - 3 p.m.

2630

31

3 p.m. - 11 p.m.

3656

44

11 p.m. - 3 a.m.

2040

25

8 a.m. - 4 p.m.

2779

33

4 p.m. - 12 mid.

3827

46

12 mid. - 8 a.m.

1720

21

9 a.m. - 5 p.m.

2893

34

5 p.m. - 1 a.m.

3804

46

1 a.m. - 9 a.m.

1629

20

10 a.m. - 6 p.m.

3025

36

6 p.m. - 2 a.m.

3712

45

2 a.m. - 10 a.m.

1589

19
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Percent of
Variance

225

208

200
175
150

154

125

117

100

106
78

75

66

50

31

28

25

o
2400

0100

0200

0300

0400

0500

0600

0700

0800

0900

1000

1100

1200

1300

1400

1500

1600

1700

1800

1900

2000

2100

2200

2300

Shift Schedule by Military Time
Figure 5. Histogram: Least Variance of Multiple
Response Indices by Shift Schedule
for more officers on the afternoon or swing shift to handle the
increased workload.
As Warren G. Bennis so aptly put it, successful change within an
organization is dependent on the ability to identify and mold
"strategic variables" such as the "resistance and adaptation" to a
planned move. 19 The realization that police officers are people and
that production is a behavior, counters strict decisions made on
quantification alone. People-oriented managers need to balance
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decisions between people and production.

The long-range result will

usually be maximum benefits. Changing shift rotation to the 4:00 a.m •

.

to 12:00 ncon scheme would have drastic organizational affects. The
7-3-11 shift change should be maintained.
Sector Requirements and Design. There are currently four patrol
sectors existing in the

Jonesb~ro

city limits. The boundaries for

these sectors have been so established for over five years. There has
never been a statistical study or justification for the design of
patrol sectors within the city. Major roadways are the boundaries for
each district and the city is divided into somewhat equal geographical
areas, comprised of sectors north, east, west, and middle. Figure 6
displays a map of the City of Jonesboro by sector.
These established sector boundaries can be easily moved to
accommodate change that would result in improvement for one or more of
the following conditions:
1.

Improved response time average for a given sector.

2.

Decrease in dispatches of police units outside of their
assigned sector.

3.

Increased officer safety by increased back-up units.

4.

Decrease in gas consumption because of efficient manpower
deployment regarding travel time to known high police service
areas.

5. Improved administration through consolidation of sectors.
6. Equalized workload balance among patrol officers.
As discussed in Chapter I of this dissertation, extensive work
has been done on the development of complex deployment designs by use
of computer modeling, probability factors, and travel-time schemes.
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One focus of this study centers on the design of patrol sectors based
on criteria established in multiple response indices by the police
manager.
The first step in accomplishing this task is generated in the
establishment of 57 one and one-half inch square geographical locations representing .5 square miles of the city. The multiple response
index for each of these geographical locations is tabulated.
For a simplified explanation of the multiple response index
calculation performed by the SPSS subprogram Multiple Response
Analysis, Table IX is presented.
The Kruskal-Wallis Test is selected to test whether the four
independent, sector geographical locations are from different
populations; or if the workload between sectors is proportionately
different between medians.

Each Multiple Response Index is tabulated

and ranked from 1 to N. The value of R (the sum of ranks) for each of
the sector multiple response indices are then determined.
The approach procedure for making a decision as to the acceptance
or rejection of the null hypothesis is strictly followed as presented
in objective statistical tests in research. 20 Hence, Table X is
presented and the following method is employed.
As previvus1y stated, it was hypothesized that the medians of the
multiple response index population are equal. This hypothesis
describes a relationship between the four existing multiple response
indices, correspondingly, one to each district currently employed by
the Jonesboro Police Department.
H was computed by means of the formula: 2l

TABLE IX
COMPUTATION OF MULTIPLE RESPONSE INDEX PER CALL*
(8,326 police calls)
MRI

= TYPE OF INCIDENT

+ COVER

+ ARREST

+ PRIORITY

5(weight) X 4(factor) + 3(weight) X 3(factor) + 3(weight) X 2(factor) + 2(weight) X l(factor)

*

4(weight) X

"

+ 2(weight) X

"

+ 2(weight) X

"

3(weight) X

"

+ l(weight) X

"

+ l(weight) X

"

2(weight) X

"

l(weight) X

"

+ l(weight) X

"

This is a simplified theoretical explanation of the MRI value for each of the 8,326 calls.
The summation of these values are tabulated for each of the 57 geographical locations comprising the City of Jonesboro, Arkansas.

w

--'

TABLE X
ORIGINAL SECTOR DESIGN: MULTIPLE RESPONSE INDICES
FOR FOUR SECTORS. DATA FOR COMPUTATIONS,
KRUSKAL-WALLIS ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE BY RANKS.
SECTORS
NORTH
MR.I
2.38
12.56
22.87
.70
25.89
.27
.87
.75
. 78
.08
15.46
6.63
3.68

N=13

EAST
Rank
32
48
51
22
52
13.5
27
24
25
6
49
42
38

R1=429.5

WEST

MIDDLE

MR.I

Rank

MR.I

Rank

HRI

Rank

42.12
5.68
.63
4.35
10.61
2.91
8.38
11.81
2.92
1. 77
2.87
.20
.30
.35
.74
1.09
.05
.03
.14
.51

56
40
21
39
46
35
43
47
36
31
34
12
15
17
23
28
3
1
9
19

.04
.19
.34
1. 65
3.18
1.70
.81
.06
.11
.16
.07
.09

2
11
16
29
37
30
26
4
8
10
5
7

54.43
17.68
26.31
9.93
26.32
6.49
8.46
.27
.46
28.25
.75
2.51

57
50
53
45
54
41
44
13.5
18
55
24
33

N=12

R3=185

N=12

N=20

R2=555

R4=487.5

--'

W
N
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k

12
H = N(N+l)

R.2

L
i

1

Ni

3 (N+1)

=1

1

-2:

T

N3 - N

Where Ni and N represent the number of cases in the ith
category and in the total sample respectively. The denominator
represents a correction for ties, where

T.1

= t.

1

3 - t.
1

t; being given the number of observations tied for a given rank.
Hence, the calculation of H for the original sector design of
Jonesboro, Arkansas is:

12

H = 3,306

[

= ~1~2~

(52,248.01 - 174)

3,306

= 189.64
it =

(429.5) 2 + (555.0) 2 + (185.0) 2 + (487.5) 2 J - 174
13
20
12
12

- 174

15.64
Correction for ties

H =

1

15.64
6

(573-57)
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Referring to a chi square table,22 for 3 degrees of freedom
(k-1), a chi square of 7.82 or larger is needed to obtain significance
at the .05 level. Since an H of 15.64 was obtained from calculation
of original sector design (multiple response indices), a decision is
made to reject the null hypothesis.
Thus, the medians of the multiple response indices are not equal,
displaying large discrepancies in workload between sectors. Observation of Table X and a calculated H of 15.64 statistically indicate
that at least one sector median is disproportionately greater than the
others. From a management perspective, this interprets into varied
workload for officers as well as increased gas resources to cover
"busy" patrol units.

A more equitable workload between sectors is

desired, if possible due to geographical considerations.
By manipulating the current sector boundaries in an attempt to
equalize MRI workload, the Kruskal-Wa1lis Test can again be employed
to test population medians. Further, a comparative analysis between
the two test runs can be conducted until a lower value of H is determined. The maximum statistical goal is to achieve an H which is lower
than a chi square of 7.82 at 3 degrees of freedom, taking into account
sector barriers and geographical design.
A proposed sector design is revealed in Figure 7. By dropping
the southern boundary of North Sector by one-half mile and extending
the Eastern boundary of Middle Sector by one-half mile, four new
patrol districts can be made which are geographically sound, similar
in population density, and alike in beat area.
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If the same procedures utilized to calculate the Kruska1-Wa11is
Test are employed for the new proposed design, a second value of H can
be computed.

It is important to note that each geographical grid was

originally designed to be bound by major streets and thoroughfares in
anticipation of patrol sector redesign. The same geographical grids
were used and none were split or manipulated in any way. Only the
summation or number of grids within each sector changed as boundaries
were moved to include or exclude new or old geographical locations.
Table XI is presented to show the data derived from the proposed
sector design.

It is important to note that North sector has

increased in number of geographical locations as all others have
decreased; subsequently beat area has followed the same pattern.
Again employing the scientific method for approved research procedures in computing the Kruskal-Wal1is Test, it is observed that a
much lower H is achieved.

In fact, an H of 3.94 is computed.

Referring to a chi square tab1e,23 for 3 degrees of freedom (k-1), a
chi square of 7.82 or larger is needed to obtain significance at the
.05 level. Since an H of 3.94 was obtained, a decision not to reject
the null hypothesis is supported.
From this decision it is possible to conclude that there is no
meaningful difference between sector medians (or between sector MRI
workload); and certainly no statistical difference as an H of 3.94
approaches a .30 probability factor that random error has no effect on
data re-examination.
Therefore, in comparing the proposed sector design to the
original design, a more equal workload balance among patrol officers
is statistically proven.

TABLE XI
PROPOSED SECTOR DESIGN: MULTIPLE RESPONSE INDICES FOR
FOUR SECTORS. DATA FOR COMPUTATIONS,
KRUSKAL-WALLIS ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE BY RANKS.
SECTORS
NORTH

EAST

WEST

MR.I

Rank

MR.I

Rank

2.38
28.25
12.56
22.87
.70
25.89
.27
.87
.75
.78
.08
.05
1.09
.14
.06
.11
.04
.07

32
55
48
51
22
52
13.5
27
24
25
3
28
9
4
8
2
5

'42.12
5.68
.63
4.35
15.46
10.61
2.91
8.38
11.81
2.92
1. 77
2.87
.20
.30
.35
.74
.03
.51

56
40
21
39
49
46
35
43
47
36
31
34
12
15
17
23
1
19

R1=414.5

N=18

R2=564

, N=18

6

MR.I

MIDDLE
Rank

MRI

.19
.34
1.64
3.18
2.51
1. 70
26.32
6.63
3.68
.81
.16

11
16
29
37
33
30
54
42
38
26
10

Rank

54.43
17.68
6.49
26.31
8.46
.61
9.93
.46
.27
.09

57
50
41
53
44
20
45
18
13.5
7

N=ll

R =326

3

N=10

l

R4=348.5
W

'-J

l~

In support of this conclusion, an analysis of response time by
sector is conducted. After determining individual sector response
times within the original design, the data is manipulated to reflect
the new locations of the proposed design

~y

sector. The results are

displayed by Table XII.
Even though the mean average response times are lower for the
proposed sector design, the relationships appear to be somewhat
spurious. Since all data was taken from the year 1980, and response
times calculated from the elapsed time a police unit was dispatched to
the time it arrived, the boundaries of sectors had little or no
affect.

In reality, if the North Sector unit was dispatched to a

call, it made no difference in elapsed time to arrival no matter if
the call was within that particular sector or crossed several sector
boundaries. Therefore, what these times reflect is the number of
dispatched calls out of sector; since those call locations absorbed
into different sectors were not calculated for the proposed sector
response times.
Hence, it can be hypothesized that the frequency of outside
sector call dispatches will decrease with implementation of the proposed sector design. From a practical sense, this interprets into
increased officer safety as back-up units will have a higher probability of being closer to their respective sectors; and a savings in
gas resource funds as patrol cars will be traveling less distance to
dispatched calls.
Determination of Patrol Strategy
In the preceding discussion, several criteria for the allocation
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TABLE XII

ORIGINAL VS PROPOSED SECTOR DESIGN:

RESPONSE TIMES

ORIGINAL DESIGN
North Sector

4 minutes 26 seconds

East Sector

4 minutes 46 seconds

West Sector

5 minutes 28 seconds

Middle Sector

4 minutes 16 seconds

MEAN

4 minutes 44 seconds

PROPOSED DESIGN
North Sector

4 minutes 33 seconds

East Sector

4 minutes 31 seconds

Hest Sector

4 minutes 50 seconds

Middle Sector

3 minutes 42 seconds

MEAN

4 minutes 24 seconds
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of police manpower by equalization of workload was established for the
Jonesboro Police Department. An assignment-availability factor was
determined, shift rotational schemes were discussed and maintained,
month and day workload variations were studied, and a new sector
design was proposed for the Jonesboro community. To this point, the
emphasis on decision-making has been limited to direct input from the
manager as to the establishment of multiple response indices. These
inputs have acted as parameters for the careful analysis of determining a patrol allocation plan. Equally important to the administrator is the selection of a patrol strategy. As used here, patrol
strategy refers to the particular combination of sector structure,
area patrol coverage, and number of response or preventive force units
which are being used in a police district each working period. 24
The purpose of this presentation is to discuss the relative merits of
some patrol strategies in an attempt to suggest an enforcement method
which will mold with the unique features of the established allocation
plan for Jonesboro, Arkansas. The goal being to design an optimum
manpower distribution, coupling allocation plan and patrol strategy,
based on multiple response indices established by the police manager.
Fixed Sector Patrol. This patrol strategy is the typical beat
structure in common use today and is exhibited in Jonesboro, Arkansas
as it is in most cities. One patrol unit is assigned to each sector
with no overlapping boundaries; however, patrol officers are frequently dispatched across boundaries when the need arises. The Fixed
Sector Patrol technique is the traditional police reponse to random
moving patrol cars in an attempt to deter crime. Officers are
expected to answer any type of call or incident that occurs within
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their respective sectors. There are no special units which handle
certain calls (excluding traffic accident investigation and selective
enforcement) and thus, each officer is responsible for his district.
In theory, Fixed Sector Patrol operates on the conclusion that
crime occurs randomly over a given geographical area; and that a
patrol car can give all parts of a specific district some patrol
coverage or protection by moving randomly throughout the sectoi when
not answering calls.

In Chapter I of this dissertation, the concept

of the random moving patrol car and crime deterrence received considerable question.
An additional premise promoted by Fixed Sector Patrol is
equalization of workload and response time. The idea that workload
can be evenly distributed by slicing a given area into districts is
only partly correct. As described in the previous chapter, the City
of Jonesboro was indeed segmented into relatively similar size sectors
and workload was proven to be statistically uniform between these
sectors. However, the workload per officer will continue to fluctuate
unevenly between shifts. Considering that Jonesboro reflected a
national trend of most police demand occurring between 9:00 p.m. and
12:00 midmight, it must be assumed that those officers working the
afternoon shift (swing) will carry a much higher workload than those
on the other two shifts. This is highly supported in Table VII. This
is not meant to subjugate the Kruskal-Wallis Test analysis conducted
earlier, only qualify and refine it. The researcher emphasizes that
given this patrol technique, it appears that the best possible sector
design was proposed.

142
Further, Fixed Sector Patrol advocates assume that a number of
districts will insure a high probability that any person calling for
help within the city will not be too far away from a patrol car for a
quick response. Donald Shanahan points out an interesting phenomenon.

He states that there is a "built-in conflict" between area,

response time, and balanced sector workload in cases where some
sectors have a high popuiation density and others have a low population density.25 If beats are designed so as to equalize work loads,
those in low population density areas will be much larger and have
longer response times.

If they are designed to have roughly equal

areas in order to make travel times equal, the high population density
beats will have a much higher workload than the low density beats.
While substantively correct, Shanahan fails to address small urban
centers, such as Jonesboro. Additionally, the proposed sector design
reflects four districts having extremely close area size and shape.
Again, these arguments are not presented to undermine the statistical
significance of the preceding discussion, only to refine it and
highlight its strong points.
In conclusion, the Fixed Sector Patrol remains the classic technique in most cities.

It has been tested, measured, and simulated

many times by man and computer and still remains worthy in terms of
patrol criteria. 26
Magnetic Beat Patrol. A second patrol method discussed is called
"Magnetic Beat Patrol." This strategy was adopted by the Chicago
Police Department in 1968 and is named after the "magnetic" affect
high call beats have in "drawing" police calls to specific geographical 10cations. 27 In order to maintain a somewhat uniform patrol,

143

the procedure calls for police units to remain in the sector in which
it last answered a call. The theoretical concept being that high call
beats will attract cars where the need is greatest.
Under a light workload, the magnetic effect is not as predominant
as with a heavy workload. Although the Chicago Police Department has
had relative success in this patrol technique, it is questionable if
criteria such as response time and travel distance to

~magnet1c"

areas

would greatly influence a small city jurisdiction having only four
sectors.
Directed Patrol. Directed Patrol is a program developed by
officers of the Kansas City, Missouri Police Department. 28 It has a
primary goal of reducing specific crimes, usually residential burglary
or armed robbery, in a given geographical location. The technique is
often referred to as a meld of saturation patrol (flooding an area
with police officers) and crime analysis (information indicating a
pattern of specific criminal activity). Thus, officers are "directed"
to patrol a specific location for a specific period of time in an
attempt to apprehend or deter specific criminal types.
One of the characteristics of directed patrol is the implementation of a deployment system whereby workload is managed more effectively. Two methods are employed to allow more control of workload
and reduce response time, thereby increasing the probability of
apprehending a criminal as the act is occurring. First, calls are
assigned a series of classifications based strictly on the priorities
of:

(1) Is the crime in progress?

(2) Are the perpetrators present

in the area? Secondly, the deployment system allows watch commanders
and sector sergeants the flexibility to deploy resources according to
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need within the present sector boundaries.

It is quite obvious that

the emphasis in Directed Patrol is on apprehension of criminals
leading to the decrease of crime.
Directed Patrol, theoretically addresses the traditional police
role of "criminal-catcher." It places little importance on the
service aspect of police work, and concentrates on high crime rate
areas.

Crime specific analysis is an integral component to the

program, as it provides continuous, detailed, and timely crime pattern
information on which to support manpower deployment.
The inherent drawback to Directed Patrol is in police-community
relations.

Dnly a small percentage of the populus receive the

greatest amount of police service. Equity of general police service
to the community is sacrificed for an attempt to apprehend criminals
by reduced response times. Capturing the essence of this discussion,
Gourley and Bristow write:
Many patrol administrators who succumb to the temptation of concentrating patrolmen in high-crime areas are taken to task by
merchants or citizens in light-crime areas, when patrolmen
continually show excessive response time to their infrequent
calls. 29
Such a condition would only be exaggerated in a small city where
manpower and resources are severely limited. Directed Patrol offers
guidance in those infrequent times that small urban centers experience
a rash of specific crimes in specific areas. However, as a full time
patrol strategy, it fails to meet the overall needs of a smaller
jurisdiction.
Team Policing. 3D Team policing is a term that has meant something different in every city in which it has been tried. The
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variations in style and form have been as numerous as the experimenters.

In the past ten years, police jurisdictions such as Richmond,

California; Multnomah County, Oregon; Dayton, Ohio; Detroit, Michigan;
Los Angeles, California; and New York City have implemented some
concept of team policing.
It will not be the purpose of this discussion to evaluate each
experience~

but to examine those operational elements of team policing

which appeared somewhat uniform within each case; and which differ from
conventional patrol concepts. These elements are: geographic
stability of patrol, maximum interaction among team members, and
maximum communication among team members and the community.
Geographic stability of patrol means the permanent assignment of
teams of police to small neighborhoods. The geographic stability of
patrol is the basic element to team policing.

In small cities, such as

Jonesboro, Arkansas, the entire city can be viewed as one large
neighborhood and the police department divided into "teams" by shift.
In any case, officers approach the patrol function in a team manner,
i.e. there may be detectives on patrol and officers in undercover
assignments, or there may be no marked police cars, or patrol is
directed to specific areas only.

Inherent in the team policing concept

is autonomous responsibility of teams to the type and style of police
services provided to the neighborhood.
Maximum interaction among team members, including internal
communication among officers assigned to an area during a 24-hour
period, seven days a week is another feature of team policing. The
element of encouraging interaction among team members is an essential
component to the strategy.

Implicit in this concept of maximum
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interaction is exchange of information. One of the techniques, within
team policing, of accomplishing this exchange is through the scheduling
of team conferences at regular intervals. The purpose of these
meetings is to describe the difficult problems or incidents of the
previous week and to discuss them with other officers, soliciting
criticism and advice. This technique is based on the approach that
continuing police problems cover more than one shift and one area and
required cooperation among several police officers. Another critical
factor in the communication process is the team leader.

It is his

responsibility to encourage the sharing of information and instill a
sense of teamsmanship.
The third common element in team policing ventures is maximum
communication among team members and the community. This is again
facilitated by meetings, only this time between teams and the
community. The purpose is to emphasize cooperative aspects of the
peacekeeping function, open lines of information, and identify
neighborhood problems. These conferences act as the vehicle for
eliciting community involvement in the police function.

Another

technique is accomplished through auxiliary patrols, ride-along
programs, and community voice in police policy making.

Finally,

maximum communication among teams and the community is enhanced by an
efficient system of referral on non-police problems (e.g. emotional
problems, abandoned cars, drug addiction, alcoholic rehabilitation) to
appropriate service agencies. These participative programs are an
important part in team policing as they are designed to bring the
police and the community together in a spirit of cooperation.
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Undoubtedly, team policing concepts address the ideals of police
work.

However, all too often, the ideals require a surplus of money,

resources, and manpower.

Each police department has a different

history and different conditions of such resources as monetary funds,
leadership, community support, integrity and initiative. The Jonesboro
Police Department is no exception.

Even though no complete and

methodologically sound evaluation of team policing is currently available in the literature, there are at least three findings concerning
team policing which have been noted. 3l First, the community attitude
toward it has proven to be outstanding, however, the patrol officer's
belief is negative to it.

Sherman captured the idea when he stated,

"the community loves it and the patrolmen hate it."32 This is only
natural, as community leaders and participants are allowed (for the
first real time) to observe the police function and be part of it. The
disadvantage is in police officer perceptions. For team policing to be
successful, the officers involved must be cooperative and
enthusiastic.

If they observe the program to be a ruse for police

administrators in appeasing community pressures (as observed in several
incidents), then the ensuing cynical and non-productive attitude
greatly detracts from the strategy. Second, the political arena of a
city has much to do with the decision to implement team policing. It
can be viewed as a "gamble," for many politicians, who wish to use the
police as an instrument to show success or failure. And finally, team
policing has exhibited the need for immediate access to quantities of
specific resources (money, technical equipment, cars, and manpower) to
be successful. Then too, the argument arises that if such resources
were applied to traditional police methods, would not they also be as
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successful? The dilemma remains; team policing takes resources.

For

small urban centers such as Jonesboro, a feasibility issue would be
prime concern before the implementation of this patrol strategy.
Split-Force Patrol. 33 The Split-Force Patrol concept is a
relatively recent development in the field of law enforcement and has
been implemented in only a few police departments in the United
States.

The first agency to implement split-force patrol on a wide-

scale basis was Wilmington, Delaware Police Department.
Split-Force Patrol is uniquely different from traditional patrol
concepts in that it "splits" or "divides" the patrol force into two
distinct and separate functions.

Under the strategy, one part of the

patrol force is assigned to respond to calls for service, investigate
crimes, and perform other assigned apprehension duties. Another part
of the patrol force is held in reserve for the express purpose of
conduting preventative patrol, or as a deterrent agent. There are, of
course, times when this distraction cannot be maintained and all units
are required to respond to calls. The primary intent, however, is for
one portion of the force to be devoted exclusively to prevention and
deterrence techniques.
Charles D. Hale notes that the primary advantage of split-force
patrol is that it allows more attention to be devoted to preventative
patrol activities and that officers are assigned this function as a
primary responsibility.34 Under traditional patrol methods, preventative patrol is usually something that is done when time permits and
after other ob1igations have been satisfied. Consequently, preventative patrol under normal patrol procedures does not always receive
the attention it deserves. 35
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Further, substantial evaluation of the split-force experiment in
Wilmington reveals several int~resting conclusions. 36 First,
response time decreased as those assigned to apprehension patrol
usually lingered in high-crime or high police demand areas. Second,
arrest-related productivity increased. And finally, police
professionalism, attitude, morale, and accountability increased.
At a single glance, split-force patrol appears to be a highly
advantageous and desirable patrol strategy for any jurisdiction.
However, a closer inspection reveals that split-patrol is, in essence,
a combination of directed patrol activity and traditional patrol
techniques.

It requires, without a doubt, excessive amounts of

manpower and resources.

Further, from a theoretical standpoint, pre-

ventive patrol is derived from the concept that the omnipresence of the
uniform officer prevents crime. Experiments in Kansas City and other
observations conclude that this may not be correct. 37 The presence
of uniform officers has a tendency to displace not prevent, crime. As
C. Ray Jeffery concluded in his well-respected work on crime prevention, the factors of certainty in detection and arrest, swiftness of
action, and sureness of punishment must be present for deterrence to be
effective. 38
Split-Patrol Force appears to be a workable compromise between
directed and preventive patrol. On one hands the use of crime analysis
is provided to detect patterns of crimes--their location, type,
frequency, and timing--so that directed patrol can focus on such
affected sites, thereby supporting the idea that most crime does not
happen randomly. And on the other hand, random-moving, preventive
patrol is assigned to increase police visabi1ity in hopes to deter such
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activity. The Split-Patrol Force assumes that some crime occurs
randomly and some does not.

It appears to be successful in those

jurisdictions mentioned and may provide a feasible strategy for small
cities like Jonesboro, Arkansas.
Tactical Patrol. The final patrol strategy to be discussed is
actually a conglomerate of three techniques, either used singularly or
in conjunction with one another. The procedures all utilize a small
sample of the overall police patrol force to provide a special patrol
unit. This patrol factor can either be a permanent assignment where
those chosen in the Tactical Patrol Force remain for extended periods
of time or they may be rotational by month, week, day, or even shift.
Where small cities are involved or where the number of sectors is
limited, it is more advantageous to have rotational assignments.
However, this will be discussed later. The three techniques are
embodied in flexible shift patrol, fluid overlay patrol, and "wild" car
patrol.
Flexible Shift Patrol. This aspect of the tactical patrol
procedure allows for a group or unit of officers to be assigned to an
lIoverlay" shift.

In other words, if the normal assignment hours are

7:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. to 11:00 p.m., then the flexible shift patrol
force may be assigned to a 6:00 p.m. to 2:00 a.m. shift. The goal
being to maximize the number of officers in a patrol capacity during
the hours of peak demand.

In most instances, the flexible shift patrol

is also a fluid overlay.
Fluid Overlay Patrol. The fluid overlay patrol technique was
first explored in Tucson, Arizona in the late 1960's.39 It provides
for a patrol force to act not only as a shift overlay, but also as a
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sector overlay. The fluid overlay patrol procedure allows for manpower
to support the regular patrol sectors. Officers in the fluid overlay
units are assigned in relative proportion to anticipated needs in a
specific geographical area.
Ideally, this unit would act in conjunction with the major body of
patrol force personnel to perform enforcement and apprehension
activities.

In a recent evaluation of this technique, overall response

to calls and response time to high priority calls were greatly improved
over traditional patrol methods. 40 The fundamental technique
employed here, is again a combination of directed patrol and split
patrol theory; the difference being only a fraction of the patrol force
is involved (one or two units). The tactical unit often being referred
to as a "wild" car, "trouble" car, "hot" car, or "felony" car.
"Wild" Car Patrol. The theoretical implications involved here are
based on the directed patrol concept--crime does not happen randomly.
The "wild" car is a shift and sector overlay unit which does not
respond to routine calls of a non-criminal nature.

It is held in

reserve, assigned to the high-crime and high-demand areas and times.
The "wild" car is primarily responsible for support of sector
officers. This means that the "wild" car responds to all major crimes
in progress and other emergencies. The "wild" car is utilized to
maximize officer presence at a scene quickly, for this reason the unit
is always two-man.
In actuality, the "wild" car performs three functions.

First, it

is primarily a major enforcement unit responding to all "hot" calls.
Because it is two-man, it maximizes officer presence in a mobile
state. Second, the "wild" car is assigned to high-crime areas and is a
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marked patrol unit.

It serves in a preventative or deterrence capacity

when not deployed. Lastly, the "wild" car acts as relief and support
to sector officers. This enables officers to take the extra time to do
a good report, or a thorough investigation, or to take a dinner break
on a busy night, without the annoying thought that a sector is empty
and back-up is a long distance away. With a "wild" car, there should
always be a centrally located unit for emergency response, except in
those extremely busy nights.
The Tactical Patrol Force offers several benefits along with
increased response time. First, the procedures allow a squad sergeant
to rotate and change the patrol assignments within a geographical
area--thus allowing an individual to become thoroughly familiar with
the entire precinct or jurisdiction. This also allows an evening of
workload among officers over a long span of time as no one is
permanently assigned a high demand sector. Second, the two-man "wild"
car technique allows for a natural "training" ground. A rookie can be
"broken in" and experience the job with the knowledge of a veteran at
his side.

This maximizes manpower use. Third, the "wild" car can be

utilized for special assignments or details without affecting the rest
of the shift.

If a stake-out is needed, or special crowd control, the

"wild" car is always available. What must be emphasized is that the
"wild" car is a complement to the traditional, fixed sector patrol
design.

Fourth, this procedure reduces calls for back-up as two

officers are present in the same car, responding to "hot" calls. This
interprets into direct savings in vehicle maintenance and gas consumption as units are no longer required to travel long distances in
support of one another. Fifth, the two man car provides officer safety
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benefits; not only within the "wild" car, but also to that unit
requesting back-up. Some agencies attempt to pair a sergeant with an
officer in the "wild" car in an attempt to always have a supervisor
immediately at the scene of a major incident. An excellent side
benefit to this technique, is the ability to directly supervise and
motivate those officers who do not produce alone or in one-man cars.
Additionally, by rotating monthly, morale is kept high by each officer
working the "wild" car and informally getting to know the sergeant in a
direct working situation. Sixth, the "wild" car is a shift overlay
which allows for at least some patrol coverage in the community during
shift change. This is especially important during the afternoon-night
shift periods of 10:00 p.m. to 1:00 a.m. as this is usually the time of
peak demand and priority calls. As exhibited in Jonesboro, the
11:00 p.m. shift change hour is the single highest hour for police call
frequency and workload. And finally, the tactical patrol procedures
allow manpower to be distributed through the totai participation of an
organization. By coordinating detective and uniform information, the
"wild" car is dispersed to areas of "most need."

If one officer is

sick or on vacation, a lieutenant or even a captain can function as the
second man in the "wild" car. This not only refreshes command with the
"street" experiences of police work, it also bridges the communication
gap between officer and management personnel.
Summary of Findings
Based on the multiple response indices of geographical locations
within the City of Jonesboro, Arkansas, the following relationships
were discovered.
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First, the need for twenty-four hour police protection required
the establishment of an assignment-availability factor in determining
patrol strength. For the Jonesboro Police Department to man one
sector seven days a week, 365 days a year computed to a 1.85 factor
based on the unique circumstances of number of days off, number of
vacation days, number of days training, etc., due to loss of officer
time.

Practically speaking, this interpreted into a need of six

officers per sector for a twenty-four hour time period; or a total of
30 officers available for patrol activity to provide services to the
Jonesboro community.
In order to determine shift hours, the number of calls by month
and day was studied. There appeared to be little variance between
months as the standard deviation of calls by month was low. However,
in comparison, there was extreme deviation between days of the week.
A plot of multiple response indices by day graphically revealed that
Friday and Saturday required more police manpower needs as their
respective workload nearly doubled that of any other day.
In selecting shift hours, an extremely low chi square and high
variance supported the conclusion that the variables of calls for
service and shift rotation were independent. Further observation
revealed that the peak hours of police activity occurred between the
hours of 9:00 p.m. and 12:00 midnight. A plot of within-shift
variance by shift rotation schemes displayed that the current assignments of 7:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. to 11:00 p.m. were most beneficial for
people-oriented production such as exhibited in the Jonesboro Police
Department.
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Further, a new sector design was compared to current sector
design by use of the Kruskal-Wallis Analysis of Variance by Ranks in
order to show equalization of workload between patrol districts. The
current design was found to have an H value of 15.64 which exceeded
the 7.82 rejection region at an alpha of .05. However, the proposed
design calculated to an H value of 3.94 at the same rejection level.
While significance at 15.64 rejected the null hypothesis, the proposed
design supported the concept that the medians of the multiple response
index populations were equal; or that the MRI workload was more evenly
balanced between sectors.

In additional support to this finding, mean

response time for the new sector design was found to be 20 seconds
lower, indicating an increase in police officer safety and a decrease
in gas resource expenditures.
Finally, several patrol strategies and techniques were
explored--fixed sector patrol, magnetic beat patrol, directed patrol,
team policing, split-force patrol, and tactical patrol. All have an
advantage under circumstances, and none can be said to be the "best"
approach all the time. The police administrator must manage and
select a strategy which uniquely fits his conditions. He must have a
keenly developed sense of cost effectiveness as there will be a finite
amount of resources allocated to his task.

He must follow a cal-

cu1ated and systematic method for decision-making that will result in
the fulfillment of the department's needs.

And most important, the

police administrator must be adaptable and flexible rin selecting an
urban patrol strategy. Policing requires a complex mix of forces to
attack the myriad of problems facing a community. The demands for
quick police response, suppressed criminal activity, and political
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expenditure justification require the development of a force-incombination that engages a number of distinct police elements in a
coordinated, cooperative, and consistent manner. 4l
These findings, considered together, support the conclusion that
the new, proposed sector design matched with a tactical patrol
strategy would improve officer efficiency (by equalizing workload) in
the City of Jonesboro, Arkansas. Appendix A offers a list of
recommendations for Jonesboro as well as an optimum design plan.
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CHAPTER V
DISCUSSION AND SUMMARY
The method designed in this study is an approach to combining
decision-making elements regarding the deployment of police patrol
manpower. The City of Jonesboro, Arkansas was used as a subject to
demonstrate this model.
An objective of social science research is to generalize findings
or stimulate research in othf:i' populations, other places, and other
times than those sampled for study itself ••• so it is with this
dissertation. The method presented herein is a process that can be
utilized in similar cities with similar problems. The logical
inferences drawn from this deployment method suggest an approach which
is highly useful and marketable in today's conditions. Small urban
centers are provided a method for achieving an optimum deployment plan
based on the total participation of the police department, considering
the political, economic, cultural, and social environment of that
unique community.
However, this treatise explores a much broader set of theoretical
perspectives than those initiated by patrol deployment. The
development of a new decision-making model (Integrated Management
Decision-Making) exposes the need for major changes in police
management thinking.
First, the relationship between the "learning" approach to
decision-making and the management of police organizations must be
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fully addressed.

Police managers must be aware that their organiza-

tions are drastically influenced by a circular and dynamic
relationship between the organization and the environment. Further,
police managers must assume that information exchange within this
relationship is directly correlated to a continuous, evolving, and
prescriptive input for exploring alternative future for
decision-making.

This tenous relationship between organization and

environment can be viewed as an educational strategy to cope with
change. Organizations learn to become capable of transformation and
adaptation by restructuring to fit the environment.

In essence, this

is the decision-making process--learning to integrate organization
with environment and vise-versa.
Second, administrators must consider the police organization from
a total systems concept.

It is both a system with vital components

and parts as well as a subsystem of a much greater environment. The
way in which the organization integrates with the other segments of
this environment determine the accomplishment and effectiveness of
specific objectives.

For this reason, political, economic, cultural,

racial, legal, and industrial influences must be considered during
internal policy changes which alter the police function.

Tradi-

tionally, police managers have not fully understood nor considered the
police role as an integral part of the environment. For example, in
Jonesboro, the redesign of patrol deployment in that city produced a
wide variety of consequences. The documented need for more police
officers placed an economic burden on the city government, which in
turn, stimulated a political argument concerning overexpenditure, all
of which was fully addressed by the local media which heightened
public interest. Appendix B refers to this situation.

165

Indeed, the need for police administrators to address environmental concerns is a primary focus of Integrated Management Decisionmaking.

Also, managers must change their concept of describing the

police world. C. West Churchman explains that a major fault exhibited
in current problem-solving approaches is the fa'ilure to think in terms
of function and purpose. l In like manner, police managers fail to
address the overall purpose of the police organization.

Instead, they

continually re-describe the police structure by dwelling on the
physical world of crime rates, new police cars, civil service tests,
etc. The natural result is a stifling of creativity, innovation, and
futuristic thinking.

Indeed, the police structure described today may

not be the same entity that will exist in tomorrow's world.
Further, more emphasis must be placed on the awareness of
turbulence and change in the environment. This dissertation has
described a very complex, dynamic, and intricate relationship between
the environment and the police organization. There exists an
important and critical demand to monitor and update these changes
within the environment so that strategies can be planned to deal with
future uncertainties and contingencies which drastically effect the
police organization. For this reason, this study suggests the
adoption of a separate and distinct police unit to assist management.
Such a unit should be internal and; responsible for the monitoring and
updating of social, cultural, economic, political, legal. industrial
and any other environmental factor which may influence the police
function.

These units could be called "Environmental Analysis Units"

and would provide a necessary input for the decision-making process.
From such units, data for brainstorming adventures, knowledge surveys,
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Delphi techniques, modeling and scenarios, strategic planning, and
other tools which stimulate imaginative thinking could be possible.
Of course. this would necessitate a police manager that is
capable of an interdisciplinary approach; one that could understand
the basic concepts of human and social interaction, one that is
cognizant of environmental influences, one that has the capacity for
conceptualization, abstract thinking, and one that can consider
problems in terms of probabilities. The police manager must be an
"expert" at listening to what others have to say and must have the
ability to "cut through" not "muddle through" an environment where
private interests abound.

He must have the ability to tolerate

ambiguity and confusion. He must have a propensity to innovate and
create new alternatives to old problems.

He must be able to "feel"

what is possible and to some extent attempt to tell the future. Such
a concept for new variation in the police management field can oniy
occur through re-training of existing police administrators. 1nservice training schools and management workshops are suggested to
fulfill this task. Additionally, new police managers should possess a
wide range of academic and work experience. The traditional concept
of the police chief with only 30 years experience within the police
ranks should be abandoned, as such personnel often perpetuate
stagnation and mediocraty.
These are not novel and radical ideas. The business world has
addressed these concepts for the last decade. What is new is the
application of such prescriptive thoughts to police organizations.
Indeed, to setforth long-range planning objectives, to develop new
concepts to deal with new problems and contingencies as well as
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formulate new steps and new procedures to deal with current situations, will require the police organization to integrate with the
environment.
Suggestions for Further Research
One of the areas of exploration regarding this dissertation is
the testing of the model presented. A prepost experimental test
should be established as an integral part of the evaluation step
incorporated in the method.

In this manner, a refinement of the

decision-making process can be conducted. Thus, improvements may be
suggested, or specific aspects modified if indicated by test results,
and implemented.
Second, the relationship between police preventive patrol
activity and crime prevention, deterrence, and on-scene criminal
apprehension must be more thoroughly examined and tested. The forms
of patrol must be assessed in relation to the allocation design and
crime analysis technique available to a police department.
Third, further research in the area of predicting crime and
volume of calls for service must be investigated so that police can be
recruited and deployed based on more accurate knowledge of the need
for police service in each geographic area and time period.
And finally, the relationship between the decision-making process
and the deployment of police patrol manpower must be a continual focus
of further inquiry. By identifying and defining those key elements in
the managerial process of decision-making, a more accurate set of
objectives and goals for the police patrol function may be attained;
thereby improving the overall performance of the police. As Magorah
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Maruyama so eloquently stated, research should be "cata1ytic."2 It
is the purpose of this dissertation, and the goal of Integrated
Management Decision-Making, to encourage the individual to develop new
types of reality-testing and problem-solving techniques. Such an
objective, highlights the research purpose and hopefully generates new
thought, innovation and creativity, so desperately needed in the
police arena.

NOTES

1 C. West Churchman, The System Approach (New York:

Dell

Publishing Company, 1979), p. 13.
2 Magorah Maruyama, "Human Futuristic and Urban Planning," AlP
Journal, (September 1973), p. 346.
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APPENDIX A
MANPOWER ALLOCATION - RECORDS SYSTEMS STUDY
Jonesboro Police Department
Jonesboro, Arkansas
Abstracts and Recommendations of Study
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PROPOSAL ABSTRACT TO THE JONESBORO CITY COUNCIL
January 19, 1981
The police officer role cannot be defined. Traditional concepts
of what a police officer should do and the qualities needed to attain
police officer status have obviously not met conventional standards.
However, the function of a police bureau has been set forth not only
in written policy but also within the minds of every citizen--to
efficiently offer service to the community, to protect the lives and
property of others, and to do so at the minimum of monetary expenses
on a cost-efficiency basis.
So it is with the Jonesboro Police Department. The challenge is
to obtain maximum efficiency and effectiveness in deploying police
manpower resources within a limited budget. To accomplish this, an
analysis of statistical data is necessary.
It will be the purpose of this study to collect and analyze a
data base by which police manpower deployment can be distributed.
This will involve coding of every radio-dispatched police "call" for
the year of 1980 in Jonesboro, Arkansas; and the computer-assisted
analysis of these police responses.
The following manpower criteria will be the discussion of
analysis and subsequent goals for this study:
1.

Prediction of rates of calls for service.

2. Determination of actual manpower (patrol units) needed per
shift.
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3. Design of patrol sectors based on equalization of workload,
priority calls, and geographical considerations.
4.

Design of a dispatch strategy based on statistical data
presented.

5.

Design of a police dispatch radio log.

6. Systemization and unification of police records and reports.
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RECOMMENDATIONS - JONESBORO CITY COUNCIL
May 4, 1981 - 7:30 p.m.
The following recommendations are based on an exhaustive research
project conducted at the Jonesboro Police Department entitled, "Police
Patrol Deployment in Urban Centers Under 100,000: A Method for
Decision-making." They are the product of long hours of study and
application of crime data to existing patrol conditions in Jonesboro,
Arkansas.
Manpower Strength.

The City of Jonesboro is the agricultural

center for northeast Arkansas.

It reflects a standard population

figure of 32,000; however, on any given day the population booms to
well over 50,000 people stemming from local trade in the surrounding
rural area.
The Federal Bureau of Investigation and the International
Association of Chiefs of Police have calculated necessary ratios for
cities having populations between 20,000 and 49,000. The FBI revealed
in the 1980 Uniform Crime Report that a police officer ratio of 1.9
per thousand population should be employed in small urban centers,
while IACP initiated a 1 officer per 500 population statistic.
Although these figures are based on national trends and Jonesboro,
Arkansas does exhibit a certain degree of uniqueness, these ratios
propose that Jonesboro (a city of 32,000) should support approximately
64 sworn police officers.
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The current manpower force of the Jonesboro Police Department is
44 sworn personnel. Statistically, it is impossible for the Jonesboro
Police Department to provide efficient and effective police services
to the community under existing patrol and manpower conditions. For
this reason, it is strongly recommended that funding for ten new
officers and three new civilian dispatchers be allocated immmediately,
thereby raising the sworn manpower strength of the Jonesboro Police
Department to 54.
Police Services. Realizing the service needs of Jonesboro, the
police department has traditionally accepted certain tasks and
functions which local merchants have enjoyed. Some of these services
are the escorting of funeral processions, the custodial security
provided banks and other merchants during deposit times, and the extra
security provided certain entertainment and sports activities in the
area.

However, with the increase in city size, population, density,

and demand for police presence, these services will not be as readily
available as in the past. All future police services will be
prioritized as to the urgency and necessity of each demand. Lower
priority services will be accomplished when manpower and resources are
available.
False Alarms.

During the year 1980, the Jonesboro, Arkansas

Police Deparmtent responded to over 875 false alarms. On each
occasion, at least two officers were sent to the location and an
average officer time expenditure was calculated at 21 minutes per
officer per alarm. Thus, for each false alarm, the police department
allocated approximately 40 minutes and two officers.
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A blaring statistic regarding false alarms revealed that the
majority were the result of a handful of private businesses failing to
fix or improve alarm efficiency. One business had over 200 false
alarms in the year. For this reason, a false alarm fine (in the form
of a city ordinance) is strongly recommended. Many cities have
adopted such a provision. An example of an alarm fine would be the
assessment of $50.00 against the business for each police response
after the third false alarm per month.
Salary Administration.

Salary administration in any organization

is always a most delicate issue.

Certainly everyone would like more

money. On the other hand, the interest of the tax payers must be
considered, and equity with other city departments is necessary. This
study revealed two observations which are directly relevant.
First, referring to the attached table, it is quite obvious that
patrol officers in the Jonesboro Police Department are substantially
underpaid. Comparing the salaries of Jonesboro police officers to
similar jurisdictions, an expansive disparity exists. A proposed
recommendation of 15 percent increase in officer salary would close
this disparity; and equal the Arkansas State Police Salary Average for
cities between 20,000 and 40,000 population.
The second observation regarding salary structure pertains to the
differentials between ranks in the agency.

It is quite apparent that

an insufficient differential exists in this regard. This situation is
attributable to the city's use of a negative step salary scale, e.g. a
patrol officer upon promotion to Sergeant "steps back" to that salary
level in the Sergeant's classification which is minimum amount above
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his current salary. Thus, a promotion often means only a nominal
increase in salary. Salary differential between ranks is generally
substantial in law enforcement agencies. For this reason, a 12 to
15 percent step differential is strongly recommended.

TABLE XIII

CITY POLICE EXPENDITURES AND SALARIES
IN ARKANSAS, 1981
(For cities with populations from 20,000 - 40,000)
CITY

POPULATION

TOTAL
CITY BUDGET

TOTAL
POLICE BUDGET

% of BUDGET
TO POLICE

POLICE
SALARIES

Springdale

21,200

$ 2,647,456

$

820,601

31%

$ 12,876

Blytheville

24,600

3,293,128

791,921

24%

11,414

E1 Dorado

24,900

2,284,582

719,450

31%

12,276

West Memphis

25,000

5,038,500

1,233,950

24%

14,928

Jacksonville

26,500

3,013,251

867,879

29%

12,780

Fayetteville

34,900

5,065,761

1,002,017

20%

11,880

Hot Springs

40,000

7,455,000

20%

12,706

1,475,422
AVERAGE:

. JONESBORO

32,900

5,494,623

952,184

25.5%

$ 12,690
11,052

17%

I.A.C.P. National Average for Police Salaries for
Cities under 40,000 Population . . . . . . . . . .

. $ 14,500

Arkansas State Average (from above)

. $ 12,690

Proposed 15% Salary Increase . . . . . .

$ 12,700

N

C
N
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RECOMMENDATIONS - JONESBORO POLICE DEPARTMENT
May 12, 1981
The following recommendations are given to Chief Edward
Cunningham, Jonesboro Police Department based on the research project
entitled, "Po1ice Patrol Deployment in Urban Centers Under 100,000: A
Method for Decision-making."
Patrol Division
1.

Initiate a short 5-10 minute roll call and meeting before
each shift to dissiminate information.

2. Require officers to carry and use personal notebooks.
3.

Distribute a list of local stolen cars ("hot" sheet) every
week.

4.

Eliminate funeral escorts.

5. Man every patrol district or sector before assigning
personnel to selective enforcement. Never utilize more than
two persons as accident investigators per shift.
6. Require officers to clear from a call before writing
reports. Stop accident investigators from typing reports and
making scale diagrams of minor accidents.
7. Attempt to supply each man with a portable radio.
8.

Buy locking shotgun mounts for police cars.

9. Standardize police weapon and ammunition.
10. Continue training officers in survival and patrol techniques.
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Radio-Dispatch Division
1. Attempt to minimize officers doing the dispatch function;
utilize civilians in this capacity.
2. Formulate policy for dispatch procedures.
3. Send automatic back-up or cover to "hot" calls and emergency
situations.
4. Attempt to minimize the dispatching of cars outside their
respective districts or sectors for cold calls.
5. Never allow more than two officers on break at the same time.
6.

Eliminate current dispatch log and reports.

Initiate the use

of recommended log and roll call meetings.
7. Send patrol cars to felony calls first. Allow the officer to
assess the situation and then ask for detective if needed.
8. Block-off dispatch area by covering front windows with a
curtain.
9. Attempt to minimize access to dispatch control by locking
side doors.
10. If personnel is available, man dispatch control with two
people.
Records Division
1. Standardize all reports.
2. Eliminate the current incident report and establish one CRIME
REPORT to be used for every call involving a crime, no matter
how tri vi al.
3. Uti Hze a 3" x 5" card crosstabulation file by name, date of
birth, address, incident type, and case number.
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4.

Initiate sequential case numbers by year; use first two
digits for the year.

5.

Initiate the use of military time on all reports.

6. Keep all original reports in Records Division. Copies may be
dissiminated to other divisions.
7. Minimize access to Records Division.
8. Route all reports to Records Division for dissimination.
9. Maintain a master report log.
10. Formulate policy for Records Division Operations.
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THE JONESBORO POLICE DEPARTMENT
FINAL RECOMMENDATIONS
May 15, 1981
The strength of any study lies within the parameters of its data,
so it is with this report.

Based on the 1980 statistical information

derived from police reports and radio-dispatch logs; and by the
employment of the previously setforth method of decision-making, the
following recommendations can be enumerated:
1.

During council with police administrators, the variables of
incident type, weight factor of call, seriousness of arrest,
and need for emergency back-up were selected as prioritized
criteria within the method. Therefore, any procedure to be
implemented should consider these standards.

2. The following allocation design can be statistically
supported based on the subjective criteria used in the method:
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TABLE XIV
RECOMMENDED ALLOCATION DESIGN
JONESBORO POLICE DEPARTMENT
Assignment-Availability Factor:

1.85

Actual patrol officers required:

30

Shift and Manpower Determination
7 officers - Morning Shift

7:00 a.m. - 3:00 p.m.

7 officers - Afternoon Shift

3:00 p.m. - 11:00 p.m.

7 officers - Night Shift

11:00 p.m. - 7:00 a.m.

3 officers - Tactical Shift

6:00 p.m. - 2:00 a.m.

6 officers - Selective Traffic Enforcement
Two officers per shift, excluding Tactical Patrol
3. Figure 8 is a redesign of sector boundaries predicated on
equalized workload (Kruskal-Wallis Test) and selected
criteria. A tactical patrol, "wild" car overlay is utilized
in the high-crime and high-demand location.

It is important

to note that the overlay unit covers not only the area of
highest demand but also the times of highest demand.
Further, the City of Jonesboro represents a natural fit to
this strategy as the high-demand location is centrally
located, enabling maximum use of the two-men "wild" car
technique.
4. All methods of patrol allocation and distribution emphasize
the fundamental need for accurate reporting of crime so data
collected can be used to reveal information of past conditions as well as predict future conditions on which the
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allocation and distribution of manpower can be based. For
this reason, an evaluation of records and radio-dispatch log
procedures should accompany the quarterly examination of
deployment needs.
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Figure 8: Recommended Sector Design with Tactical Patrol,
"Wild" Car Overlay. Shaded areas represent high multiple
response index locations.
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Jonesboro Sun.,

Friday, January 23,1981.

"

" SPORTS COMICS CLASSIFIEDS

11.

JOl'!esboro Police--

Departmen"t Efficiency Studied

In these days of rising prices
and limited budgets, many governmental agencies - on the
national, state and local levelare studying ways to tighten
their belts in order to operate
effeciently.
The Jonesboro Police Department is no exception to the rule.
Robert W. Taylor, criminology instructor at Arkansas State
University, will be donating his
time and effort to a study aimed
at maximizing efficiency and
effectiveness in deploying police
manpower resources with a limited budget. Taylor explained
during a press conference at the
Justice Complex Thursday
morning that he will conduct an
analysis of statistical data.
He added that information
gathered from the study will be
used to design Jonesboro as a
model city of under 100,000
population in efficient police
manpower. He also said a model
city program will attract nation-

al attention through articles he
hopes to have published in various journals and other such
publications.
Taylor, who has a masters degree in criminology, explained
the purpose of the study is to collect and analyze a data base by
which police manpower deployment can be distributed. This
will involve coding of every
radio dispatched police "call"
for the year of 1980 in Jonesboro
and the computer-assisted
analysis of these police responses.
"With the price of gas and
salaries these days, it is important for police departments to
make the best use of police officers," Taylor said. He added the
study will question whether
Jonesboro has enough police
officers to patrol the city ade"
quately.
Taylor said the study will be
completed in written form with-

in six months. Taylor lists objectives of the study as:
• The ability to predict rates of
calls for service.
• Determination of actual
manpower (patrol units) needed
per shift.
• Design of patrol sectors
based on equalization of workload, priority calls, and geographical consideration.
• Design of a dispatch strategy
based on statistical data presented.
• Design of a police dispatch
radio log.
• Standardization of police records and reports.
Taylor said he hopes the study
will make Jonesboro a model
city for other such cities under
100,000 population to follow.
Such a program, Taylor added,
will allow cities to operate more
efficiently on limited budgets,
while at the same time offer a
greater police protection.

Figure 9: The Jonesboro Sun, 77:36, Section B, page 1,
January 23, 1981.
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Police--

(Continued From Pqe 1)

Sprlnl')'

PRICE 15 CENTS.
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Study Indicates-

Police Manpower,
Salaries Too Low

Figure 10: The Jonesboro Sun, 77:151,
Front Page, May 5, 1981.

By LARRY FUGATE
An ellletUlve ItUdy of the Jonuboro Pollee Departmeot Indlcatea
the departmeot II aerloully undermanned and police salarlea are the
lowest for any Arkanau city In the
20,000 10 40,000 population rUlle,
City CouncU memberl were laid
Monday evenJna.
Robert w. Taylor, InItNctor In
and coordinator for law enforcement .tudlea at Arkanau State Unl·
venlty, laid aldermeo Jone.boro
police orncen need a 15 per cent
aeroll the board Ialary bllte JUII to
reacb a .tale-wlde aVOrqe of police
salaries pald by munlclpalltlel In
the population faDle.
Taylor lald tbe ltudy indicate.
manpower.bortqeo could poll mil··
jar problem., notlnt! frequeotly only
one or two orncers are avalilble to
anlWer complalnllin tbe city.
The 128 pqe ItUdy report wa. prepared by Taylor al bli dllsertatlon
requirement for a doctor of pbllolOpby In urban ltudles degree from
Portland State Unlvenlty in Port·
land, Ore.
ChIef of Police Edward M. CUD·
nlnllbam told aldermeo be aareed to
allow Taylor to ltudy the depart·
menl'l recordl (or 1980 after recelv·
inll8uthorizatlon from the councU',
Fire and Police CommiUee, a~dinll
he did nol receive a copy until
Monday.
"1 IbinIt II Is an excellent study
and reOects the needs of the Jones·
boro Police Departmenl." CunnlnS'
ham said. "I aaree with Ihe recom·
mendalion. outlined in Ihe sludy
furnished to the aldermen.
"I think salaries are low, a .....

nectedln thelttldy. I c:ld nollmow be
wa. 10lnrlO do Ibll ( . .Iary
analylll)."
Taylor, a former policeman, said
ba conducted altUdy Involvlnll8,360
complalnl. and can. lOlled by
pOlice durlnll lUI year. Cunn!nlI.
bam said lOme complalnllflled with
the Criminal Inveatillation DlvilloiJ
were nol &mODI \bole IIUdlea by
Taylor.
Taylor lave aldmnasa fOW'p&Ie
lilt of rellDmmendatlDIII. They included:
• lncre&le tba number of COIIlIIIiI.Ioned officers by 10, addInlI three
clviUan radio dllP&lcben. The deparlmenl b .. 4t commllllon"d
officen.
Taylor ltated In bill recommeodationa tbal II II "lmpolilbl. for tba
Jone.boro Police Department 10
provide efficlenl and effective
police .ervicel 10 the communlty
underexl.tInt! patroland manpower

condition..tI

Tbe recommended level II one
officer per sao rIIldeoll, or lit for a
city thesize of Jonesboro. "We don'l
need lit. We need 54. We bave a low
crime rale and wanllO keep II tbal
way."
• Placing • low priority on lOme
functinnJ now provided by the deparlmenl, Including escort. for
funerals, securlly provided for
sports and enlertalnmenl evenl.
and c:ualodlal security provided for
banks and men:hanll.
• A propoied ordinance tbal would
authorize a fine for turninS In falle
alarms. The departmenll'elpOllded
10 875 false alarm. durlni 19110, the
study sald, Including more \ban :zoo

alone bu.lnell alon•• Molt falle
alarm. w.re blam.d on faully
equ1pmasl.
Department p.r.onnel .pent
tnorethan580lIIIII-bounanswer!q
falle alarmI durInI ueo, equal 10 14
w ..kI of work by on. officer
UIIIDed to a 40 hour work wedl.
The 'Ndy AId many dtl.. have
adopled ordinancli tbat would
..... a buIIneu or individual S50
for eaeb police fIIPOIIH after tba
third falle alarm In one mOllth.
• The Ialary fBDIIII benreeo rankI
II minimal. Taylor recommeDdecla
12 to 15 per cenl differential to eocourqe officen to work for prom~
lion. "There II 110 reward fordolni a
I(oodjob."
• SaluIeIlbou1d be InI:reued by
15 per ceDt, ralJInI tba annuallalary of a patrolman with tIlree yean
aperelnce from SI1,O$l to S12,700.
Arkanau cltIn lUl'Veyed In the sal·
ary lIudy Included Sprln,dale,
Blytheville, EI Dorado, Well Mem·
pbll,Ja~vIll~Fay~eand

HotSprlnl•.

A patrolman with the West Mem·
phil Police Departmenl dra.1 a
S14,928 annual .alary afler Ihree

yean.

Taylor noted In tba IIUdy Jones-

boro baa the IeCOIIdlaraeatmunlclp-

al' budlel of the elabl cltle. surveyed, but only allocal.. 17percasl .
of the munlclpeJ budpt for police
lervicel. The percenta;e of munl·
clpal buqeu earmarked for police
lervicel rUlled from 31 per cenl
(Sprlnlda1e and El Dorado) 1020
per cenl (Fayetteville and HOI
(See POUCE Pqe Z)

Police manpower IIlPf18d thin,
Taylor told aldermen, wllb only
"one to two officen 011 the _
al
any lliveo tim.... However, be said
officen answer the averqe com·
plaint In fOW' mlnules and 44l1COnd,
well below national norml •
• He recommended c:baniIni the
boundarieI of the four patrolllCtOn
or bea.. and the alllllJlllleot of a
twO-man tactical car to answer certain type call•. The latter, be ex·
plalned, abould be aIIlIn~ 10 work
from 6 In Ibe evenlnl 10 2 In d.e
mornlnl durlnl Ibe period wben
officen receive Ibe moll com·
plalnlL
Taylor AId the study Indlcaled 70
per cenl of the calli answered by
police were In an area bounded by
cale on the north, Kilebeo on the
easl, Neltleton on Ibe soulb and
Flinl on the west.
Other areal Involvlnll an unusual·
ly blab percenlalle of calli, Includ·

InlI traffic accldeoll and criminal
complalnll, weraln North and Eul
Jonesboro.
The IaUer area IncIucIe4 Caraway
Road from Matthewa to a poInl between HIlIbIand and Race. The Ial'
ler area hal the blabell accldeot
rale In the clty.
Taylor said Ibe area In Nortb
JOIIesboro II bounded on the north
by Farrell, CulberboUie on the
Well, Jobnaoa 011 the IOIIth and Allis
011 the UlII.
Aldmneo accepted the ItUdy and
recommendation. wllboUI com·
meol.
Herbert Davll, director of the
munlclpal Departmenl of I!'Inance
and Admlnlslratlon, wa. asked
wbalbethouabloftherecommeoda·
tiona. He answered with a queatiOll.
"Wbve do we lilt the money?"
CunnlnQbam wa . . .ked If be
thoullbl any of the recommendation. would be adopled. "You'll.
bave to ta1k to the City CoulIcU," be
replied..
.
Alderman Junlcr Hageomacber
AId after the cotmcU meetlntr adjqumed be bad hoped Taylor wou1d
alIO recommend "a formula for the

revenue."

"I'm DOt maIdna any commenta
011 wbere the money Ibou1d come
; from," CUllDlnlbam .ald In reo IPO!'II to a qullllan. ''ThaI II tba
preroptlve of tba City CouncIl."
CunnlnIIwn AId Taylor hal alIo
conducted evaluatlou of PolI.ce depar\IIIastalnDetroltandEutw.
1nlI, Mleb., u a D:lember of a team
uaIaned to the qenc:lel.
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Mayor Aware Police Underpaid

Jonesboro Mayor Neil Stallings
told listeners of KASU's Current
Focus radio program Wednesday he
has known for some time that city
police officers are underpaid,
However, he added some "figures"
used in a extensive Police Department study may be incorrect and
are being checked.
Stallings said the study, which
was done by Robert W. Taylor, instructor in and coordinator for law
enforcement at Arkansas State University, is "certainly partly correct." However, there are still some
questions concerning parts of the
study.
Taylor submitted the 128 page
study to Jonesboro alderman Monday night during their regular meeting. In the study, Taylor said Jonesboro needs a additional 10 city officers and three radio dispatchers. He
also said that officers salaries
should be raised 15 percent.
Stallings told listeners that he bad
not seen the study until Monday
night and has not drawn any definite
conclusions. However, he said he
has known for "a long time" that
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city employes, including police, are things Jonesboro residents. are
underpaid, and for the past 15 years, paying for," he said.
be said he has tried to add to salaries
Jonesboro, Stallings said, has
as much as possible.
been fortunate in recieving grants.
However, Stallings questioned the The city has received some 51.5 milproposal in the study of a 10 officer lion of Housing and Urban Developincrease. He said that Jonesboro bas ment (HUD) grants in the last year
a lower crime rate than most cities to renovate the "poorer section of
it's size has, citing that "five or six town."
years ago," Jonesboro had the
"They (those who award grants)
lowest crime rate of cities of 25,000 know that if Jonesboro is given a
or more population in the country. grant, the job will be done," StallHe said that crime rate is still low. ings said. Stallings credited Jim
"The residents of the city are the McKinnon, director of the Jonesones that should tell me (if addition- 'boro Urban Renewal and Housing
al officers are needed)," Stallings Authority, with a job ~ell done.
said. "We don't have all the probCurrent Focus is presented each
lems that other cities have."
' Wednesday at 11 in the morning by
Stallings said he thought that the KASU and sponsored by the Jonescity needed about three more offic- boro League of Women Voters.
ers on duty. He added that Jonesboro may not need as many officers
as other cities used in the study for
comparison.
The mayor told listeners that,
while not completely bleak, the city's financial condition is not as good
as it has been.
He explained that because of state
and federal cuts, "some services
have and will be cut." The mayor
added that some city services that
have been enjoyed by city residents
in the past will be discontinued.
"People will just have to do some of '
this on their own," Stallings said.
However, Stallings added that
state and federal cuts would not be
as hard felt if the city could levy a
one-cent sales tax, adding many individuals who don't live in Jonesboro are using city services when
they come to Jonesboro to shop and
work and are not paying for the services. Such a tax, he said, would
bring their money in for city use and
, help lighten the tax burden on Jonesboro residents.
Stallings said he would do everything he could to generate interest in
such a proposal. He, quickly added
he will not pursue the issue if residents did not show some kind of interest.
Stallings said a one-cent sales tax
would generate some $2.5 million
dollars for the city annually. "This
sort of thing could decrease some

Figure 11: The Jonesboro Sun, 77:153, Section A, page 2,
Jonesboro, Arkansas, May 7, 1981.

Mayor, Researcher
. Dispute Police Study
By 'roNY BIFPLB

~, ~Appell

• JONFmWRO, Ark. - A repon that calls
law enforcement conditions in Jonesboro
"impossible" has provoked disagreement
between the mayor and the repon's author.
Mayor Neil Stallings said he would be
"highly surprised" if all the information in
a study by Roben Taylor is accurate. Taylor,
coordinator of law enforcement studies at
Arkansas State University, presented a sum·
mary of b:is 128-page repon on the Jonesboro Police Department to the City Council
Monday night.
Stallings said he agreed with the repon
that Jonesboro policemen should be paid
more. He said he doubted; however, that the
percentage of the city budget spent on the
Police Department, as given in the study, is
accurate. .
The study said Jonesboro spends 17 per
cent of its money on police protection. Stall·
ings Sl!id the figure was closer to 30 per cent.
The study indicated Jonesboro spends a
smaller percentage of its city budget on its
police than other Arkansas cities of similar
size.

". d
on't care what per cent we get/' said
Jonesboro Police Chief Bd Cunningham.
"fm only interested in getting the money
that insures Jonesboro has an effective police department - whether it's 7 or 17 per
cent is unimponant.
"111 run the deftllPhnent with what they
..... give me to run it with."
C1IJIJliqbam aid be had DO rtIIOn to
doubt the accuracy of Taylor's study deallng
with salaries and police budgets. He said the
parts of the study concerning the actual
operations of the department were "accu.
rate - period" ~use they were based on
the department's own records.
The study, Taylor's doctoral thesis, makes
five recommendations:
• Hire at least 10 policemen and 3civilian
radio dispatchers.
. .
• Change boundaries of Jonesboro's four
police districts to equallze the work loads of
each and create a "fifth district," which
would overlap the two districts most often
requesting police help.
• Continue plactng alowprlority on some
police functions, such as funeral escorts and
security at sporting events.
• Increase pay.
.
• Increase the pay differences between
ranks in the department .
Taylor was defending his study this week
after the mayor said on a local radio r.rogram that the study may be comparing 'ap'
pIes to oranges" in some instances. .
'Tm offended that the mayor questioned
my ability to pomy the city oi Jonesboro ..
. . The study was fact, not conjecttij'e," Tay·
lor said, adding be had assisted with similar
studies for Bast Lan.'iing and Detroit while a
student at Michigan State University.
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Stallings said the city cannot afford to
hire additional policemen or civilian dlspatchers unless another source of revenue

becomes available. Both he and CUnning·
hamsuggestedaon&Centsalestaxasapossi.
ble revenue source.
"A on&Cent sales tax would be one good
way to ~~::~ey to run the city govem·
ment,"
am said. "It's a fail' tax, if
any tax can be fair."
Stallings said the sales tax was "in the
wings," but would have to be approved by
Jonesboro voters in a referendum. He said
an election on the question could be held
later this year.
Without the tax, the mayor said there was
DO way to hire additional policemen. ''We
don't pay our officers enough," Stallings
said, "but we pay all we have to pay them
with."

StalliDp, C1uulinJham and Taylor all
agreed priorities have to be set regarding
spending city funds, but Taylor took the

strongest exception to the city's current pri·
ority list.
''Having been ~ police officer," Taylor
said, "I'm appalled at the conditions in the
POlice Department.
At these saJa.
. Jonesboro
ries, law enforcement
is not a profession.
The individual officers are to be highly
commended for adapting to Jonesboro's
spending policies."
Taylor's study compares salaries of Jonesboropolicemen with other police salaries in
Arkansas cities of similar size. Those com·
parisons are being checked by city Finance
birector Herb Davis, Stallings said.
. The study, according to Taylor, discov·
ered that Jonesboro has a "portrayed low
crime rate." Taylor said the city's low crime
rate figures do not reflect incident or com·
plaint reports that do not require police fol·
lowup investigations.
Taylor said conditions in Jonesboro today
make it "impossible" to provide efficient
and effective police protection. "It's only a
matter of time," be said, "before a police.man gets hun or a person gets hun due to
inadequate police protection."
.

Figure 12: The Commercial Appeal, 142:128,
Section B, page 1, Memphis, Tennessee,
May 8, 1981.

